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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on Internet markets and information goods.
The first essay, "Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the Value of Increased
Product Variety at Online Booksellers", presents a framework and empirical estimates that
quantify the economic impact of increased product variety made available through electronic
markets. While efficiency gains from increased competition significantly enhance consumer
surplus, for instance by leading to lower average selling prices, our present research shows that
increased product variety made available through electronic markets can be a significantly larger
source of consumer surplus gains. One reason for increased product variety on the Internet is the
ability of online retailers to catalog, recommend and provide a large number of products for sale.
For example, the number of book titles available at Amazon.com is over 23 times larger than the
number of books on the shelves of a typical Barnes & Noble superstore and 57 times greater than
the number of books stocked in a typical large independent bookstore. Our analysis indicates that
the increased product variety of online bookstores enhanced consumer welfare by $731 million
to $1.03 billion in the year 2000, which is between seven to ten times as large as the consumer
welfare gain from increased competition and lower prices in this market. There may also be large
welfare gains in other SKU-intensive consumer goods such as music, movies, consumer
electronics, and computer software and hardware.
The second essay, "Performance-based Pricing Models in Online Advertising", applies the
economic theory of incentive contracts to the study of performance-based pricing models in
online advertising and provides explanations as to when and how incorporating them into
advertising deals can be profitable. We argue that using these pricing models appropriately can
give both the publisher and the advertiser proper incentives to make non-contractible efforts that
may improve the effectiveness of advertising campaigns. It also allows the publisher and the
advertiser to share the risk caused by uncertainty in the product market. We show that key
factors that influence the use of performance-based pricing models are the importance of the
publisher's incremental efforts, precision of click-through measurement, uncertainty in the
product market, and risk aversion parameters. We also clarify issues that are being debated in the
industry, such as how the importance of the advertiser's incremental efforts and existence of
non-immediate purchases affect the use of performance-based pricing models.
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The third essay, "Renting versus Selling Durable Information Goods", studies whether a
monopoly producer of a durable information good should sell or rent its good to consumers. We
study whether the producer obtains a higher profit under a selling strategy or a renting strategy.
Our analysis shows that the conventional wisdom that a durable good monopolist would always
prefer renting to selling is no longer valid in the context of durable information goods, because
of the existence of "individual depreciation". We find that a renting strategy leads to a higher
producer surplus than a selling strategy does, when this individual depreciation parameter is
high, i.e., the utility a durable information good provides to consumers decreases relatively
slowly from the first consumption to the second consumption and so on. But when the individual
depreciation parameter is low, a renting strategy may lead to a lower producer surplus than a
selling strategy does. Whether a monopoly producer of a durable information good should adopt
a renting strategy depends on the individual depreciation parameter of the good.
Thesis Committee:
Erik Brynjolfsson, George and Sandi Schussel Professor of Management, Chair
Jerry A. Hausman, John and Jennie S. MacDonald Professor of Economics
Duncan Simester, Professor of Management Science
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Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy:
Estimating the Value of Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers
ABSTRACT
We present a framework and empirical estimates that quantify the economic impact of increased
product variety made available through electronic markets. While efficiency gains from
increased competition significantly enhance consumer surplus, for instance by leading to lower
average selling prices, our present research shows that increased product variety made available
through electronic markets can be a significantly larger source of consumer surplus gains.
One reason for increased product variety on the Internet is the ability of online retailers to
catalog, recommend and provide a large number of products for sale. For example, the number of
book titles available at Amazon.com is over 23 times larger than the number of books on the
shelves of a typical Barnes & Noble superstore and 57 times greater than the number of books
stocked in a typical large independent bookstore.
Our analysis indicates that the increased product variety of online bookstores enhanced consumer
welfare by $731 million to $1.03 billion in the year 2000, which is between seven to ten times as
large as the consumer welfare gain from increased competition and lower prices in this market.
There may also be large welfare gains in other SKU-intensive consumer goods such as music,
movies, consumer electronics, and computer software and hardware.
(Consumer surplus; Product Variety; Electronic Commerce; Welfare; Internet)
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1. Introduction
"Clearly, new goods are at the heart of economic progress. But that realization is
only the beginning of an understanding of the economics of new goods. The value
created by new goods must somehow be converted into an exact quantitative
measure...
Timothy F. Bresnahan and Robert J. Gordon (1997, p. 1)
"The Internet is providing access for people who just can 'tfind the book they are
lookingfor in a store."
Nora Rawlinson, editor of Publishers Weekly, quoted in Investors
Business Daily, June 2, 1999.
Information technology facilitates the delivery of many new products and services over
electronic networks. As these electronic networks develop and mature, it will be important to
quantify their value for customers, merchants, shareholders, and society. While much of the
attention in academic research and in the press has been on the relative operational efficiency of
the online channel versus traditional channels, we believe that important benefits lie in new
products and services made available through these channels. While it has been relatively easy to
quantify the operational costs of each channel, the value of new products and services made
available through electronic networks has remained unquantified. By default, this value has been
ignored, effectively treating convenience and selection as if its value were zero.
Our research focuses on increased product variety, which is one category of new products and
services made available through electronic networks. Internet retailers have nearly unlimited
"virtual inventory" through centralized warehouses and drop-shipping agreements with
distributors (e.g., Bianco 1997 and Mendelson and Meza 2002). Because of this, they can offer
convenient access to a larger selection of products than brick-and-mortar retailers can. Table 1
shows the difference between the number of items available at Amazon.com and a typical large
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brick-and-mortar retailer for several consumer product categories.' For example Amazon.com
and Barnesandnoble.com provide easy access to each of the 2.3 million books in print (and
millions more used and out of print titles) while conventional brick-and-mortar stores carry
between 40,000 and 100,000 unique titles on their shelves. Thus, online consumers are easily
able to locate, evaluate, order, and receive millions of books that are not available on the shelves
of local bookstores. Large differences in product variety are also seen in music, movies, and
consumer electronics products. Even Wal-Mart Supercenters, which range in size from 109,000
to 230,000 square feet, only carry one-sixth of the number of SKUs that are carried by
Walmart.com (Owen 2002).
Table 1: Product Variety Comparison for Internet and Brick-and-Mortar Channels
Product Category Amazon.com Typical Large Brick-
and-Mortar Store
Books 2,300,000 40,000 - 100,000
CDs 250,000 5,000 - 15,000
DVDs 18,000 500 - 1,500
Digital Cameras 213 36
Portable MP3 players 128 16
Flatbed Scanners 171 13
While some of these products may be available from specialty stores or special ordered through
brick-and-mortar stores, the search and transaction costs to locate specialty stores or place
special orders are prohibitive for most consumers.2 In addition, the enhanced search features and
1 Inventory values for Amazon.com were obtained from discussions with industry executives, industry estimates and
Bowker's Books in Print database (books), wholesale suppliers to Amazon.com (CDs), and direct counting of
normally stocked items. Inventory values for brick-and-mortar stores were obtained from interviews with managers
and direct observation of inventory for Barnes and Noble Superstores (Books, CDs, DVDs), Best Buy (CDs, DVDs,
Digital Cameras, Portable MP3 Players, Flatbed Scanners) and CompUSA (Digital Cameras, Portable MP3 Players,
Flatbed Scanners).
2 To illustrate this difference, on November 26, 2001 one of the authors ordered the same book through
Barnesandnoble.com and through a special order at a local Barnes & Noble Superstore. The Barnesandnoble.com
order process took 3 minutes to place, arrived in 3 days, and cost $31.99. The Barnes and Noble order took nearly 1
hour to place, took 8 days to arrive, and cost $37.45. The store was located 4.6 miles away from the author's house
(note that Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) found that the average person in the United States lives 5.4 miles away
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personalized recommendation tools offered by Internet retailers allow consumers to locate
products that would have remained undiscovered in brick-and-mortar stores. For instance,
Amazon uses at least seven separate "recommender systems" to help advise customers on their
purchases. Via these systems, new products, including obscure books, are brought to the
attention of shoppers visiting their site or emailed as suggestions to past shoppers.
Recommender systems have the potential to automate "word of mouth", speeding the discovery
and diffusion of new goods (Resnick and Varian 1997).
In effect, the emergence of online retailers places a specialty store and a personalized shopping
assistant at every shopper's desktop. This improves the welfare of these consumers by allowing
them to locate and buy specialty products they otherwise would not have purchased due to high
transaction costs or low product awareness. This effect will be especially beneficial to those
consumers who live in remote areas that do not have specialty retailers.
As one might expect, the lower transactions costs offered by the Internet have led to increased
orders for many titles not previously stocked in brick-and-mortar stores. Frank Urbanowski,
Director of MIT Press, attributed the 12% increase in sales of backlist titles directly to increased
accessibility to these titles through the Internet (Professional Publishing Report 1999). Similarly,
Nora Rawlinson, the editor of Publishers Weekly, observes:
"Publishers are finding that books on their backlists are suddenly selling well. Bookstores
are great for browsing but they are difficult places to find a specific title.. .The Internet is
providing access for people who just can't find the book they are looking for in a store."
(Lyster 1999)
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from the closest bookstore). The time to place the order included 21 minutes of driving time (round-trip) to place the
order; 8 minutes to park, search for the book in the store, search for a sales person, and place the order; 20 minutes
of driving time to pick up the order; and 9 minutes to park and pay for the special order.
The differences in variety reflect underlying differences in the technology and economics of
conventional and Internet retailers. As noted by Saul Hansell in the New York Times:
"The average book may sit on the shelf of a store for six months or a year before it is
bought. The cost of this inventory in a chain of hundreds of stores is huge. Amazon can
keep just one or two copies in its warehouse and still make the title available to the
whole country and restock as quickly as customers buy books." (Hansell 2002)
Further, anecdotal evidence suggests that consumers place a high value on the convenience
offered by Internet retailers when locating and purchasing obscure products. For example,
Yahoo/ACNielsen's 2001 Internet Confidence Index lists "wide selection of products" as one of
the top three drivers of consumer ecommerce based on a survey of Internet purchasers. However,
no systematic estimates exist to empirically quantify the dollar value consumers place on the
increased product variety available through Internet markets.3
This paper represents a first effort to apply a methodology for estimating this value to one
prominent category of products offered by Internet retailers obscure book titles. Our
methodology uses a small set of generally available statistics that track how consumers "vote
with their dollars," and thus may find application in a variety of product categories. The resulting
estimates of consumer surplus will have important economic and public policy implications,
especially as investors and managers try to understand and evaluate the value proposition of
Internet-based commerce.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the economic literature
pertaining to consumer welfare gains from new goods and increased product variety. Section 3
develops a methodology to measure consumer welfare from increased product variety offered in
3 Israilevich (2001) uses a theoretical model of product differentiation to calibrate how lower fixed costs of selling
books on the Internet may have led to increased variety, and estimates the welfare implications of it.
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Internet markets. Section 4 applies this methodology to obscure book sales over the Internet and
section 5 concludes with some broader implications. Appendix A summarizes both the model
development (Section 3) and the data necessary to calibrate the model in a general market
environment (Section 4).
2. Literature Review
The development of an empirical methodology to estimate the welfare change resulting from
price changes can be traced to Hicks' (1942) compensating variation measure. Historically
compensating variation has been difficult to measure because it involves integration of the
unobservable Hicksian compensated demand curve. However, Hausman (1981) develops a
closed-form solution for measuring compensating variation under standard linear or log-linear
demand functions. More recently, Hausman (1997a) shows that the welfare effect of the
introduction of a new product is equivalent to the welfare effect of a price drop from the
product's "virtual price", the price that sets its demand to zero, to its current price. Applying this
technique, he estimates that the FCC's decision to delay the introduction of two
telecommunication services has reduced U.S. consumer welfare by billions of dollars a year.
Subsequently researchers have examined the welfare effects of other new products in traditional
markets, using similar or more refined models. Examples include Hausman (1997b), Nevo
(2001), Goolsbee and Petrin (2001), Petrin (2001), Hausman and Leonard (2001). In addition,
Bresnahan (1986) and Brynjolfsson (1995) have looked at welfare gains from information
technology investments.
Researchers in the field of macroeconomics have also started to pay attention to new products or
new varieties of products. Bils and Klenow (2001) find that consumer spending has shifted away
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from products that have shown little variety gain. The Stigler commission (NBER 1961) and the
Boskin Commission (Boskin Commission Report 1996) conclude that the greatest flaw in the
Consumer Price Index is its failure to account adequately for new goods and quality
improvements in existing goods.
It is also worth noting that there is a large body of marketing literature examining the
relationship between perceived variety and actual assortment. Most researchers agree that
consumers generally prefer more variety when given a choice (e.g., Baumol and Ide 1956 and
Kahn and Lehmann 1991). More recently, researchers have shown that consumers' perception of
variety is influenced not only by the number of distinct products, but also by the repetition
frequency, organization of the display, and attribute differences (e.g., Dreze, Hoch and Purk
1994; Broniarczyk, Hoyer and McAlister 1998; Hoch, Bradlow and Wansink 1999; Van Herpen
and Pieters 2002). In this paper, we focus on the impact that increased availability of products in
the online channel has on consumers' actual purchase behavior. Thus, questions of shelf space
and consumer perceptions are muted relative to the actual assortment of products and observed
consumer behavior.
3. Methodology
This paper applies and extends existing welfare estimation techniques to measure the consumer
welfare gain from the increased product variety made available through electronic markets. To
do this, we define the total effect of the introduction of new products in online markets on
consumer welfare as the difference in the consumer's expenditure function before and after the
introduction, measured at the level of post-introduction utility:
CV = e(peo,pno,ul) -e(pel, Pnul), (1)
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where PeO and Pel are the vectors of pre- and post-introduction prices of existing products
respectively, PnO is the virtual price of the new product (the price that sets demand to zero), pn is
the post-introduction price of the new product, and ul is the post-introduction utility level. In
effect, equation (1) measures how much a pre-Intemrnet consumer would need to be compensated
in order to be just as well off as they would be after the emergence of online markets.
We then follow Hausman and Leonard's (2001) derivation to break the total effect into the
variety effect resulting from the availability of the new product and the price effect resulting
from changes of prices of existing products:
CV = [e(Pel, pnoul ) - e(Pel, p, p,Ul ul)] + [e(Pe,O, P.o,ul ) -e(pe, ppno, ul)]. (2)
When the vector of prices of existing products does not change before and after the introduction
of the new product, i.e., PeO=Pel =Pe, one only needs to measure the variety effect and we can
redefine the expenditure function such that e(pe,.,.) - e'(.,.):
CV = e(Pe, Pno,Ul ) -e(Pe Pnl U ) = e'(Pn0 , ul ) -e'(Pnl ,ul ) (3)
The assumption that PeO=Pe=pe appears to be valid in our empirical context because the
overwhelming majority of book prices charged by brick-and-mortar stores have not changed as a
result of the emergence of online markets. Nearly all brick-and-mortar stores sold most titles at
the manufacturer's suggested list price before the emergence of online markets and continue to
do so today. Moreover, most studies have shown that, if anything, Internet retailers tend to
increase competition and place downward pricing pressure on brick-and-mortar retailers (e.g.,
Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000; Scott Morton, Zettelmeyer, and Silva-Risso 2001; Brown and
Goolsbee 2002; Baye, Morgan and Scholten 2002). Thus, if brick-and-mortar prices were to
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change at all, we would expect them to decline. Our calculations under the zero price change
assumption would therefore underestimate true gains in consumer surplus.
To apply equation (3) in practice, we specify a standard log-linear demand function for the new
product made available by the Internet,
x(p,y) = Ap y , (4)
where p is the price of the new product, y is the income, a is the price elasticity, and is the
income elasticity. This specification is the most widely used specification in the literature of
demand estimation and it fits a wide variety of data well (e.g., Brynjolfsson 1995, Hausman
1997a, 1997b, and Hausman and Leonard 2001).4
Following Hausman (1981), we can use Roy's identity to write equation (4) as
x(p,y) =- av(p, y) / ap (5)
o%(p, y / 0,y
where v(p,y) is the indirect utility fimunction.
Solving this partial differential equation gives
plo yl/
v(p,y) = -AI + 1 (6)l+a 1-6
and the expenditure function
e(p,u) = (1-6) u+ '+ (7)[~~ +aj
4 The final result of welfare estimates will depend on the adopted specification of demand function. However, earlier
research (e.g. Brynjolfsson 1995 and Hausman and Newey 1995) finds that using a nonparametric specification with
complete freedom to fit the data may not significantly improve the accuracy of welfare estimates over estimates
using a standard log-linear specification.
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Using equations (3) and (7), it can be shown (Hausman 1981) that the welfare impact of the
introduction of a new product is given by
Fi 3I 11(1- )
CV =[L + a Y (PnoXo - pn1x1) + y-S - y, (8)
where CV is the compensating variation, 8 is the income elasticity estimate, a is the price
elasticity, y is income, (pn, xl) are the post-introduction price and quantity of the new product,
and (Pno, Xo) are the pre-introduction virtual price and quantity of the new product.
Prior research has shown that income elasticity effects can be ignored for typical consumer
products where purchases are a small fraction of the consumer's annual income (e.g. Hausman
1997a, Brynjolfsson 1995). Applying this assumption, i.e. 8=0, equation (8) simplifies to
CV= _pnlXl (CV - .1xi (9)l+a
since the pre-introduction quantity is zero and pno xo=O. If income elasticity were positive, as is
likely for books, including income elasticity in our calculations would increase our consumer
surplus estimates by a small amount (Varian 1992).
4. Data and Results
We use this methodology to measure the consumer surplus gain in Internet markets from access
to books not readily available through brick-and-mortar retailers. As noted above, for many
consumers, these obscure books can properly be categorized as "new" products because, while
they are readily available in Internet markets, the transactions costs necessary to acquire these
goods in physical markets are prohibitively high. The availability of these books to Internet
consumers reflects, in part, the increased inventory carrying capacity of Internet retailers.
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Furthermore, recommendation lists, customer and industry reviews, images of the book jacket
and selected book pages, and convenient search facilities allow Intemrnet consumers to discover
and evaluate obscure books that likely would have remained undiscovered in conventional retail
environments where these books would be unavailable for browsing.
This product category also provides a useful starting point for surplus measurement because it
represents a relatively mature Internet market, and because prior research has already measured
the reduction in prices from increased competition on the Internet (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith
2000), providing a point of reference for our surplus measurements.
In the following sections, we discuss how we estimate the parameters necessary to calculate the
consumer surplus resulting from increased accessibility to obscure books on the Internet: the
price elasticity of demand and the price and quantity of sales of obscure books on the Internet.
4.1. Elasticity of Demand
The most straightforward approach to calculate elasticity of aggregate demand would be through
direct empirical estimation. In the conclusion section we discuss how elasticity of demand might
be obtained by partnering with a book publisher or with a retailer with dominant market share to
conduct a direct pricing experiment. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain cooperation from
either publishers or retailers to conduct such an experiment. In the absence of this data, we
estimate the elasticity of aggregate demand by taking advantage of the characteristics of the book
industry structure and available industry statistics on gross margins.
To do this, we first note that the book industry is vertically structured as shown in Figure 1,
where c is the marginal cost of a book and pwi, qwi, Pri, and qri are wholesale price and quantity
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and retail price and quantity for retailer i (i=1,2, ...N) respectively.5 Publishers set both list prices
and wholesale prices of the books they publish. They sell books to retailers, either directly or
through distributors, at prices that are a set percentage of the books' list prices, typically between
43-51% off list prices. Thus, a change in the list price of a book would also result in a
proportional change in the wholesale price of the book.6 Further, wholesale prices charged on an
individual book are almost the same across retailers, regardless of the channel that the retailer
operates in or the size of the retailer (e.g., Clay, Krishnan, and Wolff 2001). Thus we have
pwi=pw for i=1,2, ...N.
Figure 1: Vertical Industry Structure in Book Sales
Prl, qrl
Pwl, qwl j
Pr2, qr2
P 2, qw2
C -| Publisher
PwN, qwN> PrN, qrN
Retailer i (i=1,2, ...N) receives books from either publishers or distributors, and then sells these
books to consumers at some discount off list price. Books in different categories are sold at
5This structure is accurate for the vast majority of consumer purchases, which are made through bookstores.
However, in a few cases, customers choose to special-order books directly from the publisher. For our purposes, as
long as these books are available from the publisher, at the same prices both before and after Internet book retailers
introduce the increased selection of books, publisher special-orders will not affect our underlying model. This
follows because, as noted above, the unchanged prices of existing products are irrelevant to consumer surplus
calculations from the introduction of new products.
6 Source: conversation with Vicki Jennings, MIT Press, July 23, 2002.
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Retailer 1
Retailer 2
Retailer N
Z/
different pre-set discounts off their list prices. For a particular book, the discount off its list price
will not change as a result of a change in its list price. Most obscure books are sold at their full
list prices.8 Therefore, for a given obscure title, there exists a stable relationship between the
book's wholesale price and retailer i's retail price, pw=kipri where ki is a constant between 0 and
1. In addition, we assume that qwi=qri. This holds for two reasons. First, most obscure books are
ordered by retailers from publishers and wholesalers after a customer initiates a purchase.
Second, according to several publishers we interviewed, as well as the American Wholesale
Booksellers Association, the vast majority of books are sold on consignment. Typically, retailers
can return unsold or returned books to publishers or distributors without penalty (except for
N
return shipping). Given this, if we define qr qri as the total quantity sold by retailers to
i=1
consumers and qw -
N
qwi as the total net quantity sold by the book's publisher to retailers, we
i=1
easily get qr=qw
7Moreover, this discount off list price is usually set by retailers in multiples of 10%. For example, in a
representative sample of 23,744 titles sold at Amazon.com in late 1999, 88.5% of them follow such a pricing pattern
-29.5% have 0% discount, 1.4% have 10% discount, 34.3% have 20% discount, 18.4% have 30% discount, 1.6%
have 40% discount, 3% have 50% discount, and 0.1% have 60, 70, 80, or 90% discounts. (See Smith 2001 for more
information on this sample of titles.)
8 We selected 100 books at random from a sample of all customer searches at Dealtime.com on July 2, 2001. Among
the 37 books with Amazon.com sales ranks greater than 100,000, 86% are sold at their respective list prices at
Amazon.com (versus 41% for the remaining titles). Lee and Png (2002) also collect data showing that bookstores
typically offer zero discounts on non-bestseller titles.
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If we define retailer i's market share on this book as si qri , then the weighted retail market
qr
N N
price can be written as p SiPri Pw . One can show that the elasticity of aggregate
i=1 i= ki
demand in the retailing market equals the elasticity of demand faced by the publisher:9
- ~ ~ ~ ~~~ I (E P dqw (E jpwdqw
pdq, pdqw 7Ji=1 Ji k pdqW (10)
(10)
qrdp qwdp qw -dPw qwdPw
Mi =1 ki ,i=iJ
Since the publisher of a particular title has total control over establishing the title's list and
wholesale price, it is reasonable to apply the well-known Lerner index formula to estimate the
price elasticity of demand faced by the publisher: l°
Pi-Ci 1 (11)
Pi aii
Publishers sell books to both online retailers and brick-and-mortar retailers, either directly or
through distributors, at wholesale prices that are a set percentage of books' list price, typically
between 43-51% off list prices. Publishers incur the same production costs whether books are
sold to an online retailer or to a brick-and-mortar retailer. Therefore, publishers sell obscure
books to online retailers and brick-and-mortar retailers at the same gross margins. Discussions
9 The elasticity of aggregate demand can be thought of as the percentage change in total market sales if all retailers
changed their price by one percentage point. In general, this will be less than the elasticity of demand faced by a
particular retailer acting independently.
10 This form of the Lerner index is applicable to single product monopolists, multiproduct monopolists who
maximize profits on a per product basis, or in instances where cross elasticity is zero. In the more general
multiproduct monopolist case, the Lerner index for product i is given by Pi - Ci = _ _ (pj - C' )qj, , where i
Pi aii ji ptqtai
andj are indexes for products. However, in the Internet book market all available evidence suggests that prices are
set on an individual book basis and thus we use estimates based on equation (11) for our elasticity calculations. If
the publisher is not a monopolist for the book title being sold, then this formula will overestimate the true price
elasticity of demand (in absolute value) and underestimate true consumer surplus.
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with various publishers indicate that the gross margin of a typical obscure title is between 56-
64%.11 Thus, using (11), the elasticity of demand faced by the publisher is between -1.56 and -
1.79, and by (10) this is also the aggregate demand in the retailing market.
This estimate can also be compared with what other researchers have obtained, albeit using
retailer data. For example, Brynjolfsson, Dick, and Smith (2002) use shopbot data to calculate an
own-price elasticity of -1.47 for retailers listing their prices at a popular shopbot, which is
somewhat lower in absolute value than our estimates. Similarly, Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003)
estimate a demand system for two online book retailers: Amazon and BarnesandNoble.com. The
imputed demand elasticity using their calculations is also lower than our elasticity estimate. As
noted in (9), a smaller elasticity will translate to a larger consumer surplus estimate.
4.2. Sales of Obscure Titles on the Internet
Internet retailers are extremely hesitant about releasing specific sales data, and we were unable to
obtain sales data from a major Internet retailer that would allow us to estimate the sales of
obscure titles on the Internet. However, we were able to obtain data from one publisher that
allow us to estimate the proportion of sales of obscure titles in total sales at Amazon.com. This
proportion should generalize to the overall Internet book market, given that Amazon.com has
approximately a 70% share of the Internet book market (Ehrens and Markus 2000).
This publisher provided data matching the publisher's weekly sales for 321 titles to the sales
rank observed at Amazon.com's web site during the same week. According to Amazon.com's
frequently asked questions page:
" For example, data from the American Association of Publishers suggest that the gross margin of a typical book is
between 56-58% depending on whether shipping is included. A typical MIT Press book has a gross margin of
approximately 63% (source: conversation with Vicki Jennings, MIT Press). A large publisher of technical books
revealed that each of their books had gross margins of between 58-64% over the past several years. A large
publisher of trade books revealed that each of their books had gross margins of approximately 60%.
22
"The [rank] calculation is based on Amazon.com sales and is updated regularly. The top
10,000 best sellers are updated each hour to reflect sales in the preceding 24 hours. The
next 100,000 are updated daily." 12
These data, gathered for three weeks in the summer of 2001, provide a fairly robust basis for
correlating sales and sales rank at Amazon.com. The observed weekly sales range from 1 to 481
units sold and the observed weekly sales rank ranges from the 238 to 961,367. Summary
statistics for this data are shown in Table 2.13
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Amazon Sales-Rank Data
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Weekly Sales 861 19.17 30.63 1 481
Weekly Sales Rank 861 31,532.85 58,350.92 238 961,367
We fit our data on sales and sales rank to a log-linear (Pareto) distribution:
log(Quantity) = l1 + 82 log(Rank) + s(12)
where is orthogonal to log(Rank) and is spherical, following the standard OLS assumptions.
This approach was suggested by Madeline Schnapp of O'Reilly Books who reported excellent
success estimating competitors' unit books sales by comparing their books' sales ranks to
O'Reilly's. Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) also fit sales and sales rank data to a (slightly
different) log-linear distribution with good success. Earlier applications include Pareto (1896),
who found that income can be approximated such a log-linear distribution, and Zipf (1949) who
suggested that city size also follows a log-linear distribution with a slope of-1.
12 Available at http://www.amazon.comn/exec/obidos/tg/browse/-/525376/104-2977251-9307125. Further
experimentation demonstrated that the sales rank does not include used book sales or sales through Amazon's
marketplace sellers.
13 The panel of titles changed somewhat during the sample period and as a result not all titles were tracked in all
weeks.
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Regressing log(Quantity) onto a constant and log(Rank), we obtain an estimate of 10.526 for l3I
and -0.871 for ,2 as shown in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Regression Results Amazon Sales-Rank Data14
Variable Coefficient
Constant 10.526
(0.156)
Log(Rank) -0.871
(0.017)
R 2 0.8008
The coefficients in this regression are highly significant and the R2 value suggests that our model
is precisely estimated. Furthermore, the estimates lead to plausible sales-rank results. Given our
estimates, a book with a rank of 10 is estimated to get 5,000 sales per week and a book with a
rank of 100,000 gets, on average, 1.6 sales per week. Likewise, integrating under the curve for
titles with rank from 1 to 2.3 million suggests that Amazon.com was selling books at a rate of
99.4 million per year in the summer of 2001. This estimate compares well with industry
statistics. 15
These estimates also compare favorably with Pareto slope parameter estimates obtained by
Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) using a clever and easily executed experiment. To conduct this
experiment, they first obtained information from a publisher on a book with relatively constant
weekly sales, then purchased 6 copies of the book in a 10-minute period, and tracked the
Amazon rank before and shortly after the purchases. Using the sales and sales rank before and
14 A graphical analysis suggests that the size of the residuals increases in rank, and a Breusch-Pagan test confirms
the presence of heteroskedasticity in the residuals. Thus we use White heteroskedasticity consistent estimator (see
Greene 2000, p.463) to estimate both coefficients. We also performed a test for structural change by interacting
log(Rank) with a dummy variable that took on the value of one for ranks larger than 40,000. The coefficient on this
variable was positive (but statistically insignificant) suggesting that our results would, if anything, be strengthened if
we based our /2 on only high rank books.
15 The 2001 Book Industry Trends lists 2000 total unit sales of books at 2.5 billion and their study also shows that
the Internet makes up 6% of total book purchases. Amazon.com has a 70% share of the Internet book market
(Ehrens and Markus 2000).
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after the experiment, they estimated ,82 as -0.855 (note that the 9reported by Chevalier and
Goolsbee corresponds to -1/82). They also estimated ,2 from similar sales-rank data reported by
Weingarten (2001) and Poynter (2000) as -0.952 and -0.834 respectively. We performed a
similar purchase experiment in September 2002 and calculated ,82 as -0.916.16 It is significant
that while these parameter estimates rely on only 2 points, they are remarkably similar to the
results calculated in Table 3 above, which are based on over 800 points.
We can use the Pareto slope parameter estimate from our data to calculate the proportion of unit
sales at Amazon that fall above a particular rank as
N
J/ 1 02 ditf1ft t N(,2+1) _ x(62+1)
r(x, N) = (/+l) l (13)
J/3 1zP~dt N(i2+l) - 1fl t"'2dt
where x is the rank, and N is the total number of books available.
What rank cutoff is appropriate for our purposes? As noted above, we wish to estimate the gain
in consumer surplus from access to books on the Internet that are not normally stocked by brick-
and-mortar stores. Thus, our rank figure should approximate the average number of books a
consumer could readily locate in local physical stores.
At one end of the spectrum one would want to consider consumers who do not have easy access
to bookstores with a broad selection of titles. In Appendix C of Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000)
16 We selected a book whose Amazon.com rank on September 13, 2002 was 606,439. We checked the rank of this
book each day between September 14 and September 30 and noted 3 changes: on Monday September 16 the book
jumped from 606,439 to 596,625; on Monday September 23 the book dropped from 596,625 to 599,352; and on
Monday September 30 the book dropped from 599,352 to 601,457. We infer from this that Amazon updates its sales
rankings on low selling books each Monday and that a sale occurred sometime during the week ending September
15 and no sales occurred during the remaining weeks. On September 30 one of the authors ordered 5 copies of this
book using 5 different Amazon user accounts. The next morning the book had a sales rank of 4,647.
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the authors calculated that the average consumer in the United States lives 5.4 miles away from
the closest general selection bookstore. Using the same dataset, we find that 14% of U.S.
consumers live more than 10 miles away from the nearest general selection bookstore and 8%
live more than 20 miles from their nearest bookstore. For such customers the relevant rank might
be near 0. That is, without the Internet such customers are not able to easily purchase even
general selection books.
More typically, consumers will have at least one and possibly multiple bookstores close-by.
However, these brick-and-mortar bookstores vary significantly in size. Small bookshops and
mall-based stores stock approximately 20,000 unique titles, large independent booksellers stock
approximately 40,000 unique titles, Barnes and Noble and Borders superstores stock
approximately 100,000 unique titles, and the Barnes and Noble superstore in New York City,
reported to be the "World's Largest Bookstore," carries 250,000 unique titles on its shelves.17
Table 4: Proportion of Sales from Obscure Titles at Amazon
Sales Rank Proportion in Standard Error'8
Total Sales
>40,000 47.9% 2.7%
>100,000 39.2% 2.5%
>250,000 29.3% 2.0%
In Table 4 we estimate the proportion of total sales at Amazon.com that lies above a particular
rank (i.e., titles that are not available at a typical brick-and-mortar bookstore) for each of the
reference points discussed above. These calculations are based on equation (13) along with the
17 Stock figures for Barnes and Noble were obtained from correspondence with Mary Ellen Keating, Senior Vice
President of Corporate Communications and Public Affairs, Barnes and Noble, December 3, 2001. Stock figures for
independent stores were obtained from multiple industry sources and discussions, including Ritchie (1999).
18 Since the proportion of Amazon unit sales that fall in titles with ranks above x is a function of 82 and we obtain
the standard error of /2 from the regression, we calculate the standard error of our estimate using the Delta Method
(see Greene 2000, p. 18).
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estimate from Table 3 for ,82 and 2,300,000 (the number of books in print) for N. This table
shows that 47.9% of Amazon's unit sales fall in titles with ranks above 40,000 and 39.2% of
sales fall in titles with ranks above 100,000, as Figure 2 illustrates. It is unlikely that every
consumer will live within reasonable driving distance to the largest Barnes and Noble superstore
in New York City and have access to the 250,000 titles stocked there, but using that number as
the cutoff point only reduces the proportion down to 29.3%.
Figure 2: Share of Amazon Sales Above Rank 100,000
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In subsequent calculations, we use a rank of 100,000 as our point-of-reference for consumer
surplus estimates. This cutoff can be interpreted either in terms of the average stock levels at a
Barnes and Noble or Borders superstore or as taking into account the possibility that consumers
shop at multiple smaller independent stores. For example, if there were only a 50% overlap in
27
stocked titles at large independent bookstores, a consumer would have to shop at a minimum of
five such stores to have access to 100,000 titles.
This large cutoff point seems fairly conservative on two dimensions. First, it is unlikely that most
consumers, particularly rural consumers as mentioned above, have access to this number of
unique titles through local bookstores. Second, even if all consumers had access to these larger
stores, the 100,000 cutoff will underestimate true consumer surplus if, as seems likely,
superstores do not stock exactly the same 100,000 most popular books that Amazon.com stocks.
4.3. Consumer Welfare
According to 2001 Book Industry Trends, book revenue in year 2000 was $24.59 billion (Book
Industry Study Group 2001). Given that the Internet makes up 6% of total book sales (Book
Industry Study Group 2001), we estimate that the total Internet book sales in 2000 were $1.475
billion. If we assume that obscure titles account for about the same proportion of total sales at
other Internet book retailers as at Amazon, the sales of titles that are not available at a typical
brick-and-mortar bookstore are $578 million based on the estimates in Section 4.2.
Since these estimates are based on aggregate figures, it is further necessary to ensure that the
average prices of obscure books sold on the Internet are not lower than the average prices of
more popular books sold on the Internet. If this were not true, we would overestimate the true
consumer surplus by using aggregate figures. To analyze the relative prices of obscure and more
popular books we selected 100 books at random from a sample of all customer searches at
Dealtime.com on July 2, 2001. We then categorized the books into obscure and regular titles
based on whether their Amazon.com sales rank was greater than (obscure) or less than (regular)
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100,000.19 Table 5 illustrates that the prices of obscure books are greater than the prices of
regular titles. Thus, if anything, our estimates using aggregate sales figures will underestimate
true consumer surplus from sales of obscure titles on the Internet.
Table 5: Price Comparison for Obscure Titles and Regular Titles on the Internet
Amazon Sales Rank <100,000 >100,000
Average List Price $34.53 $42.18
Average Amazon Price $29.26 $41.60
Average Price at $29.52 $39.06
Dealtime
Average Minimum $20.03 $29.52
Price at Dealtime
Observations 63 37
With these estimates of elasticity and revenue from obscure book sales, we use equation (9) to
calculate that the introduction of obscure books in online markets has increased consumer
welfare by between $731 million and $1.03 billion in the year 2000 alone, with standard errors of
$46.7 million and $65.8 million respectively.2
It is worth noting that our log-linear demand curve does not restrict consumers' valuation to be
below a certain dollar amount. One concern, therefore, is that our consumer surplus estimates
could be driven by a small number of consumers with very high valuations. It might be
reasonable to exclude some of these consumers with very high valuations on the assumption that
they might have been motivated to find a way to gain access to the book without using the
Internet, even if that entailed significant personal effort. On the other hand, they might never
have learned of the book in the first place without the recommendation engines, search tools and
19 Analogous results are obtained using a cutoff of 40,000, the number of books stocked at a typical large
independent bookseller.
20 Using a cutoff of 250,000 would reduce our consumer surplus estimates to between $547 and $772 million in the
year 2000, with standard errors of $37.3 million and $52.7 million respectively. Using a cutoff of 40,000 would
increase our consumer surplus estimates to between $894 and $1.26 billion in the year 2000, with standard errors of
$50.4 million and $71.1 million respectively.
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other aids provided by successful online booksellers. Discussions with a publisher suggest that
this latter effect is more important than any substitution away from conventional channels by
high value consumers.
Nonetheless, as a check on the robustness of our results, we can also conduct an analysis in
which we restrict our consumer estimates by excluding high value consumers. Excluding all
consumers with valuations above five times a book's current price would reduce our current
consumer surplus estimates by 28.0%-40.6% while excluding consumer valuations above ten
times a book's current price would reduce our current consumer surplus estimates by 16.2%-
27.5%.
We also calculate the consumer surplus gain from increased competition and operational
efficiency in Internet markets as a point of reference to the consumer surplus gains estimated
above. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) calculated that prices on the Internet including shipping
and handling charges were 6% lower than prices in brick-and-mortar retailers due to increased
competition and increased operational efficiency. A fractional price change of 0 will lead to a
s*a change in quantity, according to the definition of price elasticity of demand. Thus we have
CV = px _x -poXo -_ p,)p (1 + * a)xP (1  4)
l+a l+a
where CV is the change in consumer surplus, a is the price elasticity, (p,, x,) are the price and
quantity after the price change, and (p, xo) are the price and quantity before the price change.
Using the same estimates as were used above (i.e., px,=$1.475 billion and a between-1.56 and
-1.79), equation (14) shows that the consumer welfare gain from a 6% drop in price for all titles
on the Internet is between $100.5 million and $103.3 million. Thus, the consumer welfare gain
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from the introduction of obscure books in online markets is between 7.3 (with a standard error of
0.5) and 10.0 (with a standard error of 0.6) times as large as the consumer welfare gain from
increased competition and lower prices on the Internet.
4.4. Discussion
While the magnitude of the consumer welfare gain from increased variety is large both in
absolute terms and relative to the savings from lower prices, our approach is imperfect and is
likely to underestimate the total welfare benefits for a number of reasons.
First, it is important to note that the book market is just one of many markets affected. Online
sales of other consumer product categories, like music CDs, movies, and electronic products, are
likely to also show significant gains in consumer surplus. Furthermore, gains in all product
categories will increase as more customers gain access to the Internet channel and as new
technologies such as print-on-demand, digital content delivery, mobility services, and broadband
access further reduce consumer search and transactions costs. Finally, it is possible that the
ability to sell obscure books through Internet channels that would not have been stocked in
physical stores will allow some books to be published that otherwise would not have been
viable. 21
Second, there is some evidence that the Internet may have reduced the effective cost of special
orders even in offline stores, including the consumer time and effort required to identify the
relevant books. Some obscure titles were available in brick-and-mortar stores through customer
initiated special orders, even before the rise of the Internet as a channel for books. However,
21 While making more and more titles available online will result in higher sales, it is important to note that our
calculations demonstrate that there are diminishing returns to adding titles. For example, according to our Pareto
curve estimates, titles ranked from 100,000 to 200,000 account for 7.3% of sales at Amazon.com while titles ranked
between 200,000 to 300,000 account for only 4.6% of sales.
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according to several bookstore owners we spoke to, special orders for items not normally stocked
account for less than 1% of sales through the physical channel. This low level of special orders
should not be surprising given that the special order process in a conventional store is
inconvenient and time-consuming, as discussed above.
However, it is interesting to note that the availability of obscure titles on the Internet has
apparently led to somewhat increased sales through special orders at brick-and-mortar stores.
Several brick-and-mortar retailers we spoke to said that the Internet has allowed brick-and-
mortar customers to locate and evaluate books they would not have been able to find otherwise.
Mary Ellen Keating, Barnes and Noble Senior Vice President of Corporate Communication and
Public Affairs put it as follows with regard to sales in Barnes and Noble's brick-and-mortar
stores:
"Sales from special orders are up, and customers are ordering a broader range of titles in
a number of different categories. What some customers tend to do is their own research
on the Web and then special order the book from our stores."22
If the cost of special orders is unaffected by the Internet, then our consumer surplus calculations
can ignore changes in the quantity of special orders, while our estimates will be too low if the
effective cost of special orders were reduced as suggested by the preceding quotation.
Lacking precise data on the costs or quantities of special ordering sales of obscure titles at brick-
and-mortar stores, this potential consumer welfare gain is left out in our calculation. However,
given that the Internet has apparently led to a net increase in special order sales through the
physical channel, our calculations will underestimate the true consumer surplus from the
availability of obscure titles on the Internet.
22 Source: E-mail communication with Mary Ellen Keating, December 3, 2001.
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The Internet may also lower the cost of placing special orders in other ways. For example, on
October 26, 2000 Barnes and Noble announced a plan to install Internet service counters in all its
superstores. These service counters would allow in-store customers to place orders from Barnes
and Noble's Internet site for home delivery. While not included in our calculations, the
availability of this service will increase consumer surplus by providing Internet access in new
and convenient locations and thus lowering the cost of placing special orders to in-store
consumers and consumers who otherwise would not have access to the Internet.
Last but not least, our calculations only focus on consumer welfare gains. There may also be
significant gains in producer welfare from the additional sales. Indeed, retailers like Amazon,
book publishers, printers, and authors, all stand to benefit and earn a slice of the growing pie
created by lower search and transactions costs. In contrast, consumer welfare gains from lower
prices come largely at the expense of producers. This suggests that increased product variety
creates a total welfare gain, including both consumer and producer welfare, which exceeds the
total welfare gain from lower prices by even more than the ratio we estimated for consumer
welfare gains alone. It would be interesting to adapt the methods of this paper to also explore the
implications for producer welfare.
5. Conclusions
While lower prices due to increased market efficiency in Internet book markets provide
significant benefits to consumers, we find that the increased online availability of previously
hard-to-find products represents a positive impact on consumer welfare that is seven to ten times
larger. Limited shelf-space in conventional retail outlets constrains the types of products that can
be discovered, evaluated, and easily purchased by consumers. Limits on the number of titles
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Internet retailers can present and sell to consumers are substantially lower. As a result, Internet
customers have easy access to millions of products that they could not easily locate or purchase
through brick-and-mortar retailers.
To date, the economic effect of increased product variety on the Internet has been ignored,
effectively setting to zero the value consumers place on increased selection at Internet retailers.
Recent econometric advances have allowed for the measurement of the economic impact of such
new products. Our research applies and extends these methodologies to quantify an important
welfare impact of online markets. Preliminary calculations for one product category sold in U.S.
markets show that the welfare gains are between $731 million and $1.03 billion for the year 2000
alone. These welfare gains dwarf the consumer welfare gain from increased competition and
lower prices uncovered in previous research (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000).
There are a variety of ways our results can be extended by future research. First, while our
results use the well-known Lerner index to obtain price elasticity estimates, it may be possible
for future research to directly estimate price elasticity using an experiment in cooperation with a
publisher of obscure books or possibly a retailer with a dominant market position. Such an
experiment would change wholesale prices on a randomly selected set of titles and track the
resulting levels of demand. These price changes would be exogenous if both the titles and price
change levels (positive and negative) were selected at random for the purposes of this
experiment.
Second, it would be interesting to analyze whether consumer surplus gain from access to
increased product variety online are primarily from the reduced transactions cost to order
obscure products in Internet markets or from the lower search costs to discover books using
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Internet search and collaborative filtering tools. The example mentioned above - that Barnes
and Noble attributes a net increase in special orders in brick-and-mortar stores to consumers
discovering new books online - may shed some light on this question. If consumers gained
more value from lower transactions costs, we would expect to see a shift away from in-store
special orders to Internet purchases. The fact that the opposite seems to have occurred suggests
that the value of discovery may significantly outweigh the value of lower transactions costs. This
question deserves further analysis.
It also should be possible to extend this methodology to measure welfare contributions of other
product categories sold on the Internet or other new products made available through Internet
markets. For example, one could easily extend our results to the online sale of movies, music
CDs, or consumer electronics products. It also might be possible to estimate consumer surplus
gains from the distribution of digital products such as downloadable e-books, music, movies, and
software. Moreover, consumers should also benefit from easy access to formerly localized
markets such as RealAudio broadcasts of local radio stations or eBay auctions for products that
would otherwise have been sold in yard sales. The results of this paper suggest that ultimately
the most important benefits of Internet retailing are not fully reflected in lower prices, but rather
are due to the new goods and services made readily available to consumers.
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Appendix A: Summary of Derivation and Necessary Data
1. Derivation of the formula to calculate consumer surplus
(Follows Hausman 1981 and Hausman and Leonard 2000)
CV = e(Peo, Pno, ul ) -e(Pel, Pnl ul )
CV = [e(pei , Pno, ul) - e(Pel , Pn , ul )]
+ [e(eo, PnoU, l) - e(pe, , PnoUl)]
Assume x(p,y) = Apay 8
1P' A av(p,y) / ap
( y) = +~py / 1-y
p1+a 1-8v(p, y)= A +~'1+a 1-8
Assume peO=Pel =Pe
CV = e(p , ,nO , ul) - e(pe , Pnl , ul )
= e'(Pno, ul) - e'(Pn1, ul)
CV 1- (POX
[i+a (P 0X
Assume =0
e(p,u) = (1 -8) u + i+ )
- PnlX1) + y(1-) -y
1 PnOXO=I 
CV = Pni11+a
Notes:
* If post-introduction prices of existing products are lower than pre-introduction prices (i.e.,
Peo>Pel) results under equality assumptions will underestimate true consumer surplus.
* If '0 (i.e., if the good is a luxury good as opposed to a necessity good) results under 6=0
will underestimate true consumer surplus.
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2. Derivation of the price elasticity of aggregate demand
Assume pwi=Pw
Assume pwi=kipri
Si =
qr
pw=kiPri
N
10 PP = EiPri
i=1
N
P- SiPri
i=1
Assume qwi=qri
N
qr qri
i=1
N
qw - E qwi
i=1
qr=qw
pdqr pdq wi= wdw i =ljpwdw pwdqw
qrdP qwdp (N S.id) N qwdpw
qw I 'dp )qwl i dwi~~i k i~, =1 ki)
3. Derivation of the formula to calculate total sales of obscure products on the Internet
log(Quantity) = 8 + 2 log(Rank) + e
Estimate of 862
N
Jf,6lt2 dt
r(x,N) = 
Jfl1t2 dt
1
N(2+l) 1
PnlX = (PQ) * r(x,N)
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N
= iPw
N (92 +) X 82+1)
4. Data Requirements and Potential Sources:
Data Requirement Potential Data Sources
Elasticity of Aggregate . Lerner index and information on publisher/manufacturer
Demand (a) margins.
. Experimental estimation through partnership with
publisher/manufacturer (see pp. 10, 25-26).
. Experimental estimation through partnership with retailer with
a dominant market position (see pp. 10, 25-26).
. Industry estimates of elasticities.
Total sales of products on . Market research firms.
the Internet (PQ ) . Department of commerce reports.
. Industry consortia.
Proportion of sales of · Estimation using log-linear relationship between sales
obscure products at Internet rank and sales and data obtained from
retailers (r(x,N)) publisher/manufacturer (pp. 14-16).
. Experimental estimation using power-law relationship
between sales rank and sales and observation of changes in
rank after purchase of goods (Chevalier and Goolsbee 2003,
pp. 16-17).
. Direct observation from representative
publisher/manufacturer.
. Direct observation from retailer (or retailers) with dominant
market share.
Total sales of obscure . Total sales of product category on the Internet *
products on the Internet proportion of sales of obscure products at Internet
(P"jXJ) retailers.
. Direct observation from representative
publisher/manufacturer.
. Direct observation from retailer (or retailers) with dominant
market share.
Potential data sources in bold indicate those used in this paper.
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Performance-based Pricing Models in Online Advertising
ABSTRACT
The Internet is an accountable and measurable medium with bidirectional information flows.
This makes possible performance-based pricing models that tie online advertising payments
directly to campaign measurement data such as click-throughs and purchases. These pricing
models have become increasingly popular in the online advertising industry.
This paper applies the economic theory of incentive contracts to the study of these pricing
models and provides explanations as to when and how incorporating them into advertising deals
can be profitable. We argue that using these pricing models appropriately can give both the
publisher and the advertiser proper incentives to make non-contractible efforts that may improve
the effectiveness of advertising campaigns. It also allows the publisher and the advertiser to
share the risk caused by uncertainty in the product market. We show that key factors that
influence the use of performance-based pricing models are the importance of the publisher's
incremental efforts, precision of click-through measurement, uncertainty in the product market,
and risk aversion parameters. We also clarify issues that are being debated in the industry, such
as how the importance of the advertiser's incremental efforts and existence of non-immediate
purchases affect the use of performance-based pricing models.
(Online advertising; Pricing model; Incentive; Performance)
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1. Introduction
"Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted. The problem is that I don't
know which half it is."
Attributed to Lord Lever, founder of Lever Brothers
"(Web marketing) is accountable and measurable-the perfect direct-response
medium. If 50 percent of advertising isn't working, with the Web you know
which 50 percent."
Michael Kubin, founder and CEO of Leading Web
Advertisers, quoted in Chief Executive 2000 CEO E-
Conference Report (Woods 2000)
The Internet has emerged as an important medium for advertising. According to Interactive
Advertising Bureau's recent report (Interactive Advertising Bureau 2003), U.S. advertisers spent
$6.0 billion on online advertising in 2002, and online advertising accounted for 2.5 percent of
total U.S. advertising spending, surpassing advertising in traditional media such as outdoor
advertising and business papers advertising. Jupiter Research forecasts that online advertising
revenue will grow to $14.8 billion in 2008, when it will account for 6 percent of total U.S.
advertising spending. (Jupiter Research 2003)
While there is no doubt about the future of the Internet as an important advertising medium,
there has been much confusion on which pricing model should be used. In the early days of
online advertising, online advertisers and publishers have simply borrowed the widely used CPM
(cost-per-thousand-impressions) pricing model which is the standard in traditional media
advertising. In this model, every time an advertisement is displayed, the publisher can collect
money from the advertiser. It does not matter if consumers notice it, let alone interact with it.
Recently, both advertisers and publishers have started to realize that the Internet is a much more
accountable and measurable medium than traditional media. In traditional media advertising,
information flows only in one direction: from the advertiser to the publisher, and from the
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publisher to consumers. Thus the advertiser does not have direct contact with consumers, and
this makes the measurement of an advertisement's effectiveness very difficult. For some
traditional media like TV, companies like Nielsen provide measurement data through consumer
surveys. For other traditional media, even such data are unavailable. In contrast, the Internet is a
bidirectional medium that allows the advertiser to have direct contact with consumers. The
advertiser can track how consumers respond to its advertisement through various interactivity
metrics, such as click-throughs, unique visitors, average viewing time, and purchases (Hoffman
and Novak 2000b, Interactive Advertising Bureau 2002). This property of the Internet being a
bidirectional medium has enabled performance-based pricing models that let the advertiser pay
more for advertisements that perform well and pay less for advertisements that do not perform.
Currently there are two performance-based pricing models that are widely used. The first model
is called a CPC (cost-per-click-through) model. Under this model, the publisher receives no
guaranteed payment for each impression delivered. Instead, the publisher receives a payment for
each click-through that has occurred. The second model is known as a revenue-sharing or CPA
(cost-per-action) model. Under this model, the publisher receives no guaranteed payment for
each impression delivered. Instead, the publisher receives a payment from the advertiser for each
purchase that has occurred and can be traced to advertisements delivered by the publisher.
As these performance-based pricing models emerge, the online advertising industry is engaged in
a debate over which pricing model should be used. Should the industry stick to the traditional
CPM model, or should the industry use performance-based pricing models, such as CPC and
CPA models? (see Digitrends 2001 and Meskauskas 2001) On one side of the debate, many
publishers prefer the CPM model because of its low financial risk for them. In addition, they
argue that they are only good at attracting and retaining an audience by informing and
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entertaining them, and that they cannot control many factors that affect the performance of an
advertisement, such as the design of an advertisement, attractiveness of the offer and the sales
process. On the other side of the debate, many advertisers prefer performance-based pricing
models because these models deliver measurable ROI and pose little risk to them. Advertisers
argue that it does not make sense to pay for advertisements that generate no value, when the
Internet makes it possible to measure performance. (see Braud 2001, Hallerman 2002, Heyman
2001, McCrea 2000a, 2000b, and Sisney 2000)
As the debate goes on, we have observed that performance-based pricing models become more
and more widely used. Leading portals like Google and Yahoo now all offer performance-based
advertising in which advertisers only pay for clicks and conversions. Google says more than
100,000 advertisers have signed up for its performance-based advertising, and Overture, a
subsidiary of Yahoo, has about 80,000 advertisers using performance-based advertising. Pay-for-
performance search advertisements are expected to generate $1.5 billion to $2 billion in 2003, up
from $100 million in 2000. (Liedtke 2003) A Forrester report (Nail et al. 2001) says that deals
that include performance-based elements, already accounting for 50 percent of online advertising
spending in 2001, will account for 53 percent of online advertising spending in 2006.
Why are performance-based pricing models becoming so popular? What factors affect the use of
performance-based pricing models? This paper applies a formal model to these problems and
provides potential explanations as to when and how incorporating performance-based pricing
models into advertising deals can be profitable. We argue that online publishers can make non-
contractible efforts that may improve the effectiveness of advertising campaigns. However, these
efforts are costly to publishers, thus publishers will not make these efforts unless they are given
proper incentives to do so. Therefore, online advertisers have to offer publishers incentives
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through performance-based pricing models that tie publishers' advertising revenue to the
measurable effectiveness of advertising campaigns. The greater the importance of publishers'
non-contractible efforts to the effectiveness of advertising campaigns, the more incentives
publishers should be given, which translates to a higher reliance on performance-based pricing
models. On the other hand, if advertisers can make some of these efforts contractible and include
them in their contracts with publishers, they should rely less on performance-based pricing
models.
This paper explains some commonly-observed phenomena in the industry and provides guidance
to managers on how to use performance-based pricing models, by matching our model to current
industry practices. It shows that key factors that influence the use of these pricing models are the
importance of the publisher's incremental efforts, precision of click-through measurement,
uncertainty in the product market, and risk aversion parameters. It also clarifies issues that are
being debated in the industry, such as how the importance of the advertiser's incremental efforts
and existence of non-immediate purchases affect the use of these pricing models.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related management and
economics literature and discusses the differences in modeling between this paper and the
existing literature. Section 3 develops a model of the publisher, advertiser, and advertising
campaign measurement. Section 4 solves for the optimal contract. Section 5 uses this result to
explain why and how performance-based pricing models should be used and examine what
factors may affect their use. Section 6 extends the formal model to discuss how the advertiser's
efforts and non-immediate purchases affect the optimal contract. Section 7 concludes with some
broader implications.
2. Literature Review
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Only recently have researchers started to study online advertising. Baye and Morgan (2000)
explain why publishers tend to derive the bulk of their revenue from advertising rather than
subscription fees. Dewan, Freimer and Zhang (2002) study the optimal amount of advertising an
online publisher should place on its pages. Dreze and Zufryden (1998) show that the design of
web pages can affect the effectiveness of advertising. However, there is very little literature that
directly studies pricing models in online advertising. Hoffman and Novak (2000a) describe
various pricing models in online advertising and provide a lot of industry insights. Hoffman and
Novak (2000b) present a case study of CDNOW's successful pay-for-performance affiliate
program. Neither paper formally models this problem. This paper represents a first effort to
apply a formal model to this problem.
We conceptualize performance-based pricing models in online advertising as contracts that
provide publishers and advertisers with incentives to make non-contractible efforts, and allow
publishers and advertisers to share risks. We draw upon the economics literature that studies
incentive contracts when moral hazard exists in a principal-agent model, in particular, the models
proposed by Holmstrom (1979) and Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, 1991). These types of
models have been applied to the study of incentive contracts in the context of agricultural
sharecropping (see Allen and Lueck 1992 for a review), retail franchising (e.g., Lafontaine and
Slade 1996), executive compensation (see Murphy 1999 for a review), sales-force compensation
(e.g., Banker, Lee and Potter 1996), and customer satisfaction incentives (e.g., Hauser, Simester
and Wernerfelt 1994).
We apply and extend a model that is used by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to the study of
performance-based pricing models in online advertising. Most of the papers that have studied
incentive contracts in various contexts consider contracting problems between a firm and its
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employees. Thus they use a restricted version of the model that assumes that the principal is risk
neutral (the agent is still risk averse), partly for simplicity and partly because of the belief that
individuals are usually more risk averse than firms. Nonetheless the assumption that the
principal is risk neutral will both distort the optimal contract by having the principal shoulder
most of the risks, and prevent the study of how the principal's risk aversion affects the optimal
contract. We consider the contracting problem between an advertiser and a publisher, both being
firms. Thus we use a more general version of the model suggested by Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1987) that allows both parties to be risk averse.2 Using this more general model allows us not
only to obtain an un-distorted optimal contract, but also to study how the principal's risk
aversion affects the optimal contract. More importantly, it reveals a previously obscured fact that
signals can differ in terms of whether their use adds uncertainty to both parties' payoffs, or their
use shifts uncertainty from one party to another. We find that these two different types of signals
are used differently in the optimal contract. These results have not been obtained in the existing
literature. In Section 6, we further consider a problem in which both parties are risk averse and
both parities can make non-contractible efforts.3
3. A Model of Publisher, Advertiser, and Campaign Measurement
In our model, we focus on two entities that are involved in an online advertising contract: an
online advertiser and an online content publisher. The advertiser sells a product (or service) to
consumers through the online channel. In order to boost its sales, the advertiser launches an
online advertising campaign by designing an advertisement and contracting with a publisher so
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) prove that a linear contract is optimal in a more generalized setting where both the
principal and the agent are risk averse, but they introduce the assumption that the principal is risk neutral for
simplicity when they derive comparative statistics for an example. This may have influenced many papers that
follow them to assume that the principal is risk neutral.
21 thank Rajiv Banker for suggesting using this more general version of the model.
3 This double-sided moral hazard problem is first raised by Reid (1977) and has been studied by others.
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that the publisher would deliver its advertisement to consumers who may be interested in the
product it sells. An impression is defined as an instance of the advertisement being served to a
consumer's browser.
Every time the advertisement is served to a consumer's browser, the consumer may choose to
ignore the advertisement, or to click on the advertisement and be taken to the advertiser's store,
which we refer to as a click-through. If the consumer is taken to the advertiser's online store, the
consumer may make a purchase, or leave without making a purchase. Click-through rate ( c ) is
defined as the ratio of click-throughs to impressions, and purchase rate (p) is defined as the
ratio of purchases to impressions.
The Publisher's Efforts ep
The publisher can make efforts (decisions and actions) to improve the effectiveness of the
advertising campaign. Some of these efforts are contractible. For example, the publisher can
experiment with the size, background color, animation style, and placement of the advertisement
in the content page and find a combination that attracts the most attention of consumers.4 These
efforts-an advertisement's size, placement, and rotation schedule-are usually stipulated in the
contract between the advertiser and the publisher. The existence of these efforts adds more
clauses to the contract, but will not affect the choice of various pricing models. Thus we will not
focus on these efforts.
However, a lot of the publisher's efforts are non-contractible. For example, whether the publisher
closely associates the advertisement with its surrounding content and whether the publisher
chooses appropriate wording in its pitch to consumers both affect the advertisement's
4Dreze and Zufryden (1998) show that the effectiveness of promotional content on a website is influenced by the
website's background color and pattern, image size, style of display, and use of Java Applets and frames.
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effectiveness. More importantly, the publisher can serve the advertisement to consumers who are
the most likely to be interested in it by using a targeting technology based on its knowledge of
consumers' demographics, geographical location, expressed interests and other information.
(Needham 1998, Maislin 2001) These efforts are either non-observable or too expensive and too
difficult for the advertiser to observe and monitor. Aside from the difficulty and cost of direct
monitoring, it may be in the advertiser's best interest to give the publisher some freedom to make
decisions and actions, because of the publisher's better knowledge of consumers who visit its
website. We focus on these non-contractible efforts and call them ep .
It is worth noting that the publisher's efforts ep that we focus on are incremental efforts above
and beyond what the publisher will make without incentives. We assume that purchase rate 0 is
a linear function of the publisher's efforts ep, and we model the impact of standard efforts on
purchase rate as a positive intercept. The influence of other factors on purchase rate is modeled
as uncertainty .s , which is distributed normally with a mean of zero and a variance of arp.
Formally, we have:
Op =ap + pep + p, ap >0, ip >. (1)
The Advertiser's Measures
The advertiser can observe the result of the publisher's efforts, i.e., purchase rate. Another
possible measure the advertiser can use is click-through rate. It is reasonable to assume that
click-through rate is positively influenced by the publisher's incremental efforts. Formally, we
assume that click-through rate 0c equals a linear fimunction of the advertiser's efforts ep, plus
random noise sc that is distributed normally with a mean of zero and a variance of acc. Thus
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Oc = ac + ic + , ac > , fic > O. (2)
We assume that ep, uncertainty in the product market, is uncorrelated with cc, random noise in
the measurement of click-through rate.
The Publisher's Motivation
Incremental efforts are costly to the publisher, and become more costly as total effort level
increases. We model the publisher's cost of incremental efforts by a quadratic cost function that
is widely used in the literature of incentive contracts. Formally, the cost of efforts ep is
2C(ep) = ep /2. (3)
We assume that the publisher acts in its own best interest when it decides on the level of
incremental efforts that it will make. When the publisher is paid purely on a per-impression
basis, it will focus on creating better content and attracting a bigger audience. The publisher has
no incentive to make any incremental efforts that may improve the effectiveness of the
advertising campaign. This highlights the fact that the interest of the advertiser and that of the
publisher are misaligned under a pure CPM model.
When an advertising contract includes performance-based elements like a per-click-through
payment or a per-purchase payment, the publisher starts to weigh in the cost and benefit of
making incremental efforts, and decide the level of incremental efforts it will make. However,
performance-based elements expose both parties to uncertainties. For example, when the
payment from the advertiser to the publisher is tied to click-throughs, both parties are exposed to
the random noise in the measurement of click-through rate-when click-through rate is
unexpectedly low, the publisher loses advertising revenue; when click-through rate is
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unexpectedly high, a contract with per-click-through payment can send costs through the roof
and break the advertiser's budget. In parallel, when the advertising payment is tied to purchases,
both parties are exposed to the uncertainty in the product market-when sales are unexpectedly
strong, a contract with per-purchase payment can force the advertiser to pay too much; when
sales are unexpectedly weak, the publisher loses advertising revenue.
Due to all the uncertainties mentioned above, we now must model the publisher's risk aversion.
We assume that the publisher has exponential utility with CARA (constant absolute risk
aversion) parameter of rp (rP > 0), which means, u(yp) = 1 - exp(-rpyp) when the publisher's
payoff is yp .5 The certainty equivalence of the publisher's payoff is
CE(yp) = E(yp) - rpVar(yp)/2 .
The Advertiser's Utility Function
We assume that the advertiser also has exponential utility with CARA (constant absolute risk
aversion) parameter of ra (ra > 0), which means, U(Ya) = 1 - exp(-raya). The certainty
equivalence of the advertiser's payoff is CE(ya ) = E(ya) - raVar(ya) /2.
Timeline
First, the advertiser offers a contract to the publisher. Second, the publisher can decide to accept
the contract, or to decline the contract in which case it obtains a utility of u0 and the game is
over.6 Third, if the publisher accepts the contract, the publisher decides the level of its
5 This type of utility function has proved to be a good approximation in a variety of cases.
6 The publisher has this outside option because it could potentially advertise for other advertisers. Such a
competition between the advertiser and other potential advertisers prevents the advertiser from making a "low-ball"
offer to the publisher.
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incremental efforts ep. Finally, the advertiser and the publisher observe click-through rate and
purchase rate, and payoffs to the advertiser and the publisher are realized.
4. The Optimal Contract
In principle, an advertising contract could be any function of click-through rate and purchase
rate. Fortunately, our mathematical formulation implies that the optimal contract is a linear
function of these two variables. This result follows from our assumptions that random noise in
the measurement of click-through rate and uncertainty in the product market both conform to
Normal distributions and that the advertiser and the publisher both have exponential utility with
constant absolute risk aversion. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) provide a detailed proof, and
Banker and Datar (1989) identify necessary and sufficient conditions for other formulations to
have linear optimal contracts. Although the exact linearity of the optimal contract depends on
technical assumptions, linear contract is a good approximation to a variety of incentive contracts.
More importantly, linear contract, because of its simplicity, is the most widely used form of
contract in online advertising (Hoffman and Novak 2000a).
We first specify a linear contract that includes a CPM element and two performance-based
elements, and then we study the propensity of each element being used in the optimal contract.
Formally, such a contract specifies a guaranteed payment for each impression, t, a per-click-
through payment, tc, and a per-purchase payment, tp. Under this contract of (tm tctp), the
publisher can expect to receive from the advertiser, for each impression delivered, a payment of
tm +tcOc + t p Op, if click-through rate is Oc and purchase rate is p.
The Optimal Behavior of the Publisher
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If the publisher accepts a contract of (tm ,tc,t p) and makes efforts ep, the publisher's payoff is:
2 2yp =tm +tcoc +tpOp -ep /2=tm +tc(ac +,8cep +ec)+tp(a p +,/pep +ep)-ep /2. (4)
The certainty equivalence of the publisher's payoff is:
CE(yp) = E(yp) - rpVar(yp) /2
=tm +tc(a, + I.ep)+tp(ap + flpep)-ep2 /2-rp(tc2 acc +tp2 app)/2
The publisher who is assumed to be rational will act in its own best interest and choose a level of
incremental efforts that maximizes the certainty equivalence of its payoff. The first-order-
condition of (5) gives the publisher's incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, which is:
ep* = argmax CE(y ) = tcic + t, . (6)
Equation (6) shows that a larger per-click-through payment or per-purchase payment will induce
the publisher to make a higher level of incremental efforts.
In order for the publisher to accept the contract, the contract must give the publisher a utility of
at least u 0 . In other words, the publisher's individual rationality (IR) constraint is:
CE(y ) > uo . (7)
The Optimal Contract
Let m be the profit that the advertiser makes on each purchase. The advertiser's payoff is:
Ya = (m-tp) p -t -ntctc = (m-tp)(ap +epepe +p)-t m -tc(a +cep +c. (8)
The certainty equivalence of the advertiser's payoff is:
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CE(ya) = E(ya) -ra Var(ya) / 2
= (m- t)(a p + /,3pep) -tm - t (ac + c, ep) ra[t2ar, + (m tp)2 ] 2
(9)
We define the optimal contract as the contract that maximizes the advertiser's utility (equation
(9)) under the condition that both the publisher's incentive compatibility (IC) constraint
(equation (6)) and its individual rationality (IR) constraint (equation (7)) are satisfied.7
An increase of the per-impression payment, tin, lowers the advertiser's utility while increasing
the publisher's utility by the same amount. The optimal contract that maximizes the advertiser's
utility will set the per-impression payment, t, such that the publisher obtains a utility of uo.
This implies
tm*=u 0 +ep2 /2+rp(t 2 rcc +tp2app)/2-tc*(a c +cep)-tp *(ap +pep) (10)
Substituting (6) and (10) into (9) gives us
CE(ya) = m[a p +I (tcI3 +tplp2)]-(tc2fi +tpfp) 2 /2-(r p +ra)tc2 cc /2
2 . ~(11)
-ra(m-tp)2 pp /2-rptp2app /2-u 0
Finding the optimal contract is now a matter of solving the first order conditions of (11), with
respect to tc and t , together.
PROPOSITION 1. The optimal contract, which maximizes the advertiser's utility under the
condition that both the publisher's incentive compatibility (IC) constraint and its individual
rationality (IR) constraint are satisfied, is given by
7 We can also think of another formulation of the optimal contract that maximizes the sum of the advertiser's utility
and the publisher's utility. By Kuhn-Tucker Theorem, the second formulation is just a special case of our current
formulation in which the multiplier on the publisher's individual rationality (IR) constraint is set at 1. Therefore, the
optimal contract as we have defined also maximizes the sum of the advertiser's utility and the publisher's utility.
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t* m r ra p 12)
rP + rrp +(ra + rp c1pp fapp
r~rp 1+
,O 2 )6g2Ce
tc *= m rp 1(13)
ra + r c + + (ra + rp)C cc(13)
+
jpp ficapp )6pc
For the proof of this and all other propositions, please see the appendix.
5. Why and How Should Performance-based Elements Be Used?
We first discuss why performance-based elements should be used in the contract between the
advertiser and the publisher. We then study how these performance-based elements should be
used by examining how the optimal contract is affected by various factors.
Should Performance-based Elements Be Used?
PROPOSITION 2. The advertiser obtains a higher utility by includingperformance-based elements,
in addition to a CPM element, in its contract with the publisher, as opposed to using only a CPM
element.
To understand this proposition, let us first consider the case of a pure CPM contract. Under this
contract, the publisher has no incentives to make incremental efforts. As a result, the advertising
campaign is unlikely to be very effective, and the advertiser will not achieve high sales and a
high utility. However, under a contract that includes performance-based elements, these
performance-based elements give the publisher incentives to make incremental efforts that may
improve the effectiveness of the advertising campaign. Proposition 2 says simply that it is
possible to select appropriate parameters for performance-based elements such that the
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advertiser's utility increases. It is worth noting that including performance-based elements in the
contract between the advertiser and the publisher increases the sum of the advertiser's utility and
the publisher's utility. In our model we assume that the publisher always obtains a reservation
utility of u0 and the advertiser reaps all the benefit from using performance-based elements. But
it is reasonable to think of scenarios in which the publisher shares the benefit from such a change
by negotiating a higher per-impression payment. Proposition 2 explains why performance-based
pricing models have become more and more widely used in online advertising. (Liedtke 2003,
Nail et al. 2001)
How Should Performance-based Elements Be Used?
PROPOSITION 3. If the importance of the publisher's incremental efforts to the effectiveness of the
advertising campaign is smaller, the optimal contract places a smaller weight on click-throughs
and purchases.
Performance-based elements are used in online advertising because they can provide the
publisher incentives to make incremental efforts that may improve the effectiveness of the
advertising campaign. The greater the importance of the publisher's incremental efforts to the
effectiveness of the advertising campaign, the more incentives the publisher should be given to
make these efforts, which translates to a higher reliance on performance-based elements. On the
opposite side, if some portion of the publisher's incremental efforts can be made contractible and
be included in the advertising contract, the importance of the publisher's incremental efforts will
decrease. This alleviates the need to give the publisher incentives and leads to a lower reliance
on performance-based elements. The online advertising industry has continued to standardize
online advertising formats and terminology. For example, Interactive Advertising Bureau has
recently developed standards and guidelines on advertisement size, placement, measurement, and
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auditing. These new standards and guidelines aim to define standard efforts that the publisher
must make and limit incremental efforts at the publisher's discretion. According to Proposition 3,
their development will lower the industry's reliance on performance-based pricing models.
It is shown in Proposition 1 that the optimal contract places positive weights on both click-
through rate and purchase rate-two signals of the publisher's incremental efforts. This result
follows from Holmstrom (1979)'s informativeness condition. In our model, neither click-through
rate nor purchase rate is a sufficient statistic for the pair of them. Therefore, both should be used
in the optimal contract. In addition, the weight placed on a signal depends on its precision. An
increase in the precision of a signal leads to an increase in the weight placed on that signal. This
rule also applies to our model.
PROPOSITION 4. If click-through rate is measured with greater precision, a) the optimal contract
places a greater weight on click-throughs and a smaller weight on purchases, and b) the
advertiser obtains a higher utility.
Proposition 4 shows that click-through rate can be relied more heavily upon if it is a more
precise measure, because this exposes the advertiser and the publisher to lower risks. In addition,
this proposition helps explain the efforts over the past few years by industry practitioners to
obtain a more precise measure. When the cost-per-click pricing model was first introduced, there
was no uniform standard on the definition of click-through rate. Some publishers, in order to
inflate their click-through rate, used various tricks like displaying input boxes that are really
pictures to deceive people into clicking. This action made click-through rate an unreliable
measure of the publisher's incremental efforts. Since then, the online advertising industry has
started to standardize advertising measurement and to use other interactivity metrics to refine the
measurement of click-through rate (Interactive Advertising Bureau 2002). These efforts aimed at
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obtaining a more precise measure will likely make both the advertiser and the publisher better
off.8
PROPOSITION 5. As uncertainty in the product market decreases, a) the optimal contract places a
greater weight on purchases and a lower weight on click-throughs, and b) the advertiser obtains
a higher utility.
Proposition 5 shows that purchase rate can be relied more heavily on if uncertainty in the product
market decreases. The intuition is that, as uncertainty in the product market decreases, purchase
rate becomes a more accurate signal of the publisher's incremental efforts, and relying on a more
accurate signal exposes the advertiser and the publisher to smaller uncertainty and lower risk.
This proposition also sheds light on what products are good candidates for deals that tie
advertising payments to purchases. According to this proposition, products that are suitable for
these cost-per-action (CPA) deals are products that are mature, have steady and predictable sales,
and have a low level of market uncertainty. In contrast, these deals are not suitable for products
that are new and unproven, unless there is a mechanism that can limit these products'
uncertainty. The online advertising industry shares our view on this problem, and has taken
actions to limit products' uncertainty. For example, Affiliate Fuel, a CPA advertising network,
requires all new advertisers to run a test campaign before they can enter a larger scale contract.
(Affiliate Fuel 2003) Similar ideas of providing historical data on an advertiser's past
advertisements and performing an upfront test before entering a larger CPA deal are expressed in
Digitrends (2001) and Hallerman (2002).
How Do Risk Aversion Parameters Affect the Use of Performance-based Elements?
8 In our model we assume that the publisher always obtains a reservation utility of u and the advertiser reaps all
the benefit from a more precise measure. But it is reasonable to think of scenarios in which the publisher shares the
benefits from such a change by negotiating a higher per-impression payment.
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We first examine how the assumption of the advertiser (principal) being risk neutral would affect
the optimal contract. Substituting ra = 0 into (12) and (13) gives
2
r_____ f c pp
t *=m/ 1+ -/3 + PP ) (14)
t (=4Mr +P CC + ric) (15)
The comparison of (14) with (12) shows that the optimal per-purchase payment when the
advertiser is risk averse has one additional term, r (ra + rp), than when the advertiser is risk
neutral. This term exhibits the role of the cost-per-action pricing model as a mechanism for the
advertiser and the publisher to share risks, in addition to its role as a mechanism to give the
publisher incentives to make incremental efforts. This risk-sharing term is reduced to zero when
the advertiser is risk neutral, because in that case it is desirable for the advertiser to shoulder
most of the risks. However, this risk-sharing term does not surface in the optimal per-click-
through payment, either in (13) or in (15), because the cost-per-click pricing model does not act
as a risk-sharing mechanism. Although tying advertising payments to purchases shifts
uncertainty from the advertiser to the publisher, tying advertising payment to click-throughs adds
uncertainty to both parties' payoffs. These two signals-purchases and click-throughs-have
different properties, as a result, they should be used differently in the optimal contract. The
difference between these two signals would have been obscured if the advertiser were assumed
to be risk neutral.
Next we study how risk aversion parameters affect the use of performance-based pricing models.
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PROPOSITION 6. a) The optimal per-purchase payment increases as the advertiser becomes more
risk averse, and it decreases as the publisher becomes more risk averse. b) The optimal per-
click-through payment decreases as the advertiser becomes more risk averse. However, the
relationship between the optimal per-click-through payment and the publisher 's risk aversion
parameter is inverted-U-shaped.
A higher per-purchase payment from the advertiser to the publisher means the publisher
shoulders a larger proportion of the risk caused by uncertainty in the product market. This
becomes more desirable as the advertiser becomes more risk averse, and less desirable as the
publisher becomes more risk averse. This is shown in Proposition 6.
However, a higher per-click-through payment would expose both the publisher and the advertiser
to a higher level of risks associated with the measurement of click-throughs. This becomes less
desirable as either the advertiser or the publisher becomes more risk averse. But we also have to
consider whether the publisher is given enough incentives to make incremental efforts. In the
case of the advertiser becoming more risk averse, the publisher will be given a higher per-
purchase payment that translates to a higher level of incentives. Thus, the incentive consideration
is unnecessary in this case, and the optimal per-click-through payment decreases. In the case of
the publisher becoming more risk averse, the publisher will be given a lower per-purchase
payment that translates to a lower level of incentives. Thus, the incentive consideration becomes
effective, and the balancing of the incentive consideration and the undesirability of using per-
click-through payment leads to an inverted-U-shaped relationship between the publisher's risk
aversion and the optimal per-click-through payment.9
9 If we assumed that the advertiser (principal) is risk neutral, we would not have obtained this result. Instead, we
would have obtained the traditional result that the optimal per-click-through payment decreases as the publisher
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6. Extensions
In this section, we make extensions to the formal model to clarify issues that are being debated in
the online advertising industry regarding the use of performance-based pricing models.
The Advertiser's Efforts
In our basic model, we focus on non-contractible efforts that can be made by the publisher to
improve the effectiveness of the advertiser's advertising campaign. However, one can argue that
a campaign's effectiveness depends on the advertiser's efforts as well. We assume that the
advertiser can make efforts to convert more click-throughs to purchases by designing a
convenient-to-browse storefront, making attractive offers and having good customer services.'l°
For example, a Forrester report (Nail et al. 1999) claims that advertisers can "entice consumers
with tempting product displays, irresistible offers, and a satisfactory customer experience to
close the sale". Maislin (2001) holds a similar view and he says that "no matter how well the
advertisement is written and targeted, if the product or even the transaction experience itself is
terrible, no conversion will take place." These efforts made by the advertiser are either non-
observable or too expensive and too difficult for the publisher to observe. Thus they are non-
contractible, and the advertiser will not make these efforts unless it is in its best interest to do so.
We focus on these efforts and modify our basic model to study how the existence of these efforts
affects the optimal contract.
(agent) becomes more risk averse. That is, dt, * / drp < 0, using the t * in equation (15). An example of the
traditional result can be found in Lafontaine and Slade (1996).
10 One may also think that the advertiser can make efforts to improve click-through rate. The advertiser controls the
design of the advertisement--"creative", and the advertiser can make efforts to improve the attractiveness of the
design so that the advertisement will draw consumers' attention and result in a higher click-through rate. These
efforts are observable by the publisher when the advertiser submits its advertisement to the publisher. Thus, the
publisher can ensure the advertiser will make a certain level of these efforts, by setting a standard the advertiser's
design must meet in the advertising contract. The existence of these efforts will not affect the choice of various
pricing models. Thus we will not focus on these efforts.
64
We make two modifications. First, we assume that purchase rate p is now a linear function of
the publisher's efforts ep and the advertiser's efforts ea. Formally, we have
Op = ap +pep + pea + p, ap > 0, ip > 0, > . (16)
Second, the advertiser's efforts are costly to the advertiser, and become more costly as total
effort level increases. We model the advertiser's cost of efforts by a quadratic cost function that
is widely used in the literature of incentive contracts. Formally, the cost of efforts e is
C(ea) = ea /2. (17)
We solve for the optimal contract, and compare it with the optimal contract when the advertiser
cannot make efforts that may convert more click-throughs to purchases.
PROPOSITION 7. The optimal contract places a lower weight on purchases and a greater weight
on click-throughs when the advertiser can make efforts to convert more click-throughs to
purchases, as opposed to when the advertiser cannot make these efforts.
When the advertiser can make efforts to convert more click-throughs to purchases, the
contracting problem becomes a double-sided moral hazard problem. In such a problem, the
optimal contract should give both parties incentives to make their efforts, and the size of a
party's incentive should be proportional to that party's role in deciding the outcome ofjoint
efforts. To reflect the increased role of the advertiser, the optimal contract should have a higher
percentage of the advertiser's payoff depending on purchases. This results in a smaller per-
purchase payment from the advertiser to the publisher. However, a smaller per-purchase payment
would reduce the publisher's incentives. In order to maintain an appropriate level of incentives
for the publisher, the publisher should be given a higher per-click-through payment.
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Non-immediate Purchases
In the basic model, we focus on immediate purchases made by consumers, and we assume away
non-immediate purchases. In other words, we assume that a consumer who sees the advertiser's
offer will either make an immediate purchase, or make no purchase and forget the offer. This
assumption of no non-immediate purchases becomes a concern in two scenarios. First, non-
immediate purchases can be significant for products that have high value or products that are
difficult to be evaluated, such as cars and electronics. It is likely that a consumer who sees an
offer of these products will not make an immediate decision on whether to make a purchase. But
such a consumer may remember this offer, later come back directly to the advertiser's store, and
make a purchase. A study cited by Briggs (2003) shows that an advertiser gets 80 percent of its
conversions from these returning consumers. Second, some products, for instance, medicines,
office supplies, and insurance policies, feature high repeat purchase rates. Consumers usually go
directly to the advertiser's store when making repeat purchases. These repeat purchases can also
be thought of as non-immediate purchases and can be a significant part of the total purchases.
In both these scenarios, online advertising increases both immediate purchases and non-
immediate purchases-purchases that are not immediate and cannot be traced to an
advertisement at a certain publisher. We modify our basic model to consider how the existence
of non-immediate purchases may affect the optimal contract.'" We introduce a variable
A, (0 < A, < 1) which stands for the percentage of immediate purchases in the total purchases and
we assume that the advertiser knows this percentage. Thus, AOp is the immediate purchase rate,
and (1- A)0p is the non-immediate purchase rate. We use AOp to substitute Op in the
11 I thank Erik Brynjolfsson and Jerry Hausman for suggesting studying non-immediate purchases.
66
optimization problem, and we also add (1- ,A)9p to the advertiser's payoff. We solve for the
optimal contract when non-immediate purchases exist, and compare it with the optimal contract
when non-immediate purchases do not exist.
PROPOSITION 8. The optimal per-purchase payment is higher when non-immediate purchases
exist, as opposed to when non-immediate purchases do not exist. However, the optimal per-click-
through payment is independent of non-immediate purchases.
The intuition for Proposition 8 is as follows. The advertiser benefits from non-immediate
purchases just as it does from immediate purchases. However, since the publisher does not get
credit for these purchases, the old optimal contract, if it were used, would not have given the
publisher enough incentives to make incremental efforts. In order to solve this problem, the new
optimal contract sets the per-purchase payment as if the advertiser's profit from each purchase
were m / 2, which means giving the publisher full credit for non-immediate purchases, while the
per-click-through payment is kept intact.
It is worth noting that the online advertising industry is evolving in a direction of giving the
publisher credit for non-immediate purchases. When CPA pricing model was introduced, the
publisher got per-purchase commission only for purchases that happen immediately after a
consumer's click-through. Recently, many advertisers have started to give the publisher longer
commission duration-the amount of time the publisher can receive commission for a purchase
after a consumer has first clicked-through. (See Commission Junction 2003, Franco and Miller
2003) Although the industry is leaning toward addressing the problem of non-immediate
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purchases through the use of cookies, this trend of giving the publisher credit for non-immediate
purchases is certainly consistent with what Proposition 8 suggests.1 2
Summarizing the analysis in Section 5 and 6, Table 1 shows how various factors can influence
the use of performance-based pricing models in online advertising.
Table 1: Factors that Affect the Use of Performance-based Pricing Models
Factors Per-purchase Payment Per-click-through
Payment
Importance of
publisher's incremental + +
efforts
Precision of click- +
through measurement
Uncertainty in the +
product market
Publisher's risk aversion inverted-U-shaped
aversion
Advertiser's risk +
+
aversion
Importance of
advertiser's +
incremental efforts
Existence of non-
+ unchangedimmediate purchases
7. Conclusions
Because the Internet is a medium with bidirectional information flows, performance-based
pricing models that tie online advertising payments directly to campaign measurement data such
as click-throughs and purchases are possible. These pricing models have become increasingly
widely used in the online advertising industry. This paper attempts to provide a formal structure
to analyze issues related with this new phenomenon.
12 When a consumer clicks-through an advertisement, this consumer is assigned a cookies number and is classified
as belonging to the publisher who has delivered the advertisement. Thus, this publisher will receive commission for
all the purchases made by this consumer within the commission duration.
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More specifically, we focus on non-contractible efforts that the publisher and the advertiser can
make to improve the effectiveness of advertising campaigns, and we define measurement data
such as click-throughs and purchases as noisy signals of these non-contractible efforts. Using
well-established premises and a simple model, we provide an explanation of why performance-
based pricing models are desirable. An online advertising contract that includes appropriate
performance-based elements gives the publisher and the advertiser proper incentives to make
their efforts, and helps align the interests of the publisher and the advertiser. We use this model
to explore factors that may influence the use of performance-based pricing models and to clarify
issues that are being debated in the industry.
There are a variety of ways our results can be extended by future research. First, we only analyze
the incentive contract problem between one advertiser and one publisher. Researchers may
explore cases that have oligopoly players. In addition, it may be interesting, but perhaps
technically challenging, to make extensions to different utility functions, nonlinear mappings
from efforts to click-throughs, and nonlinear mappings from efforts to purchases. Some of these
extensions can be analyzed in the context of a linear contract between the advertiser and the
publisher, but others may require nonlinear contracts. We suspect that most of the results, as
summarized in Table 1, would be qualitatively unchanged.
This paper has a number of propositions that predict how the use of performance-based pricing
models is influenced by various factors such as the importance of the publisher's incremental
efforts, precision of click-through measurement, uncertainty in the product market, and risk
aversion parameters. These factors differ across different advertisers and different publishers. It
would be interesting to have these propositions tested using empirical data.
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Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. The Hessian matrix of (11) is
F-[8C2 +(ra +rp)ccc]
- flpPc _ [f2 + (ra + r )c ]] , and it is negative definite. This guarantees
the existence of a unique global maximum. First order conditions of (1 1), with respect to tc and
tp, are
(Al)
mraapp + (m-tp)p 2 - tp (ra + r)app -tcpl c =0.
Solving (A1) and (A2) together gives us (12) and (13).
(A2)
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. We need to prove that (itp = 0, tc = O0) is not an optimal solution. Since
Proposition 1 has proved that (tp = t*, tc = t*) is a unique global maximum, we only need to
prove that t * and tc * are nonzero. This is implied by rp > 0 and r > 0.
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(m - tp )PP)6c - [c2 + ( + p )cc]t =0 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. Let , = 8,,c and ,8p = ,/Jp. Plugging 8,, = /JS and ,p = ,8p into
(12) and (13) and differentiating the new t * and t, * with respect to gives us
(-1)
(ra + r)app+(~c 'pp1
2 
,p cc]-
(-2)(ra + rw)rpp >,
/ 33P>2
(-1)
+, c+ , p +(ia+r.)o
(-2)(ra + rw)cc > 0.
]3jpj,
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. a) Differentiating tp * and t, * with respect to a,, gives usd t c ~~r_ *_________ 
dt *
dt *
dcr ¢
(-1) [ /3 (ra+rw)< 0+ Wi . + ric <0,
52
[c ,'pp
3 2
r+a w1 + (r + rw) + ,p,
b) By Envelope Theorem, we can directly differentiate CE(ya) with respect to rcc. Doing so
give us dCE(ya ) dacc = -(rp + r )tc / 2 < 0.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. a) Differentiating t * and tc * with respect to app gives usdtc*~~~~~~~~~~~
ra + rw pF C +fip cc
/ 
rw (-1)
r
2+ (ra + rw)cc 1
+P,,OC
dt, */--
rIw
ra + rw
dt = rw
d/3 ra + rw
1ra + + (ra + )O,
Ai 6 a pp 6pc-1
rw H)(-1) (-1) >0.
Occ
dtc *
d'pp
dtp *
=m.
dapp
A 2
+ 2cc6P Ccc
<0.
]
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ra + rW -
-
-
fipa. (-I) > 0,
A UP, 2
i
b) By Envelope Theorem, we can directly differentiate CE(ya) with respect to crpp,. Doing so
give us dCE(ya)/d dcrpp = -ra(m- tp) 2 /2- r pt p2 /2 < O.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6. a) Differentiating t * with respect to ra and rp gives us
dtp *
_n rp 1
dra (ra +rp)2
1
(ra + rp)ap
f 2
[r
2
Pfc O'pp
+ 2
lp cc
fp2P
+ ~ 32
_c 2 or '2
2
f p C'cc
21
2p cc jflp O'cc
(ra + rp)Cpp
p 2
+
(r + rp )CTpp
+ 2 +
)p
p 2cc
f 2ap
/p 2cc
p 0 c
-ra
ra +rp
b) Differentiating tc * with respect to ra and rp gives us
1 Fr
(r + )2 c+ (r+rp )c c2? 
pp fc¢pp ppfc
(. c /rp)CC (a P
ra + + +
1 /p pcr~,, lPplc
(ra + rp Y c
1P fp aPcc
(ra + rp )ac
/ppc
2
C P+ pcc
Ip PC a PP
2(r + rp)Ca 1
+ 1 <0,
?6pfc
The relationship between tc * and rp is inverted-U-shaped.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7. The advertiser's payoff is Ya = (m - tp )9p - tm - tc9c - ea2 / 2, and its
certainty equivalence is
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dtp *
=-m (r. +rp)2
- pp
p2
1+ (ra +rp)app
p 2
+ 
2
#p CCcc
<0.
I
dtc *
dra
dt *
drp
WII
r
CE(Ya) = E(Ya)- ra Var(ya) / 2
= (m-tp)(ap + /3pep + pea)-tm -tc(a + /3cep)-ea2 /2 - ra[t c2 cc +(m-tp) 2 oa]/2
(A3)
The first-order-condition of (A3) gives the advertiser's incentive compatibility (IC) constraint,
which is
ea* = argmax CE(ya) = (m-tp)ryp .
The publisher's payoff is yp = tm + t c + t,9, - e 2 /2, and its certainty equivalence is
CE(yP) = E(yp) rw Var(yp)
2=tm +t(a + e)+t(a +/e +ypea)ep2 2-r(t2 +t2 )2
= t + tc(a, + fc e ) +tP(a + fl, e + p%) -%P /2 - r.(tc 2 'c" + t2r,,)/ 2.
(A4)
(A5)
The first-order-condition of (A5) gives the publisher's incentive compatibility (IC) constraint,
which is
ep* = arg max CE(yp) = t3 c + t/3p. (A6)
The optimal contract will set tm such that the publisher obtains a utility of uO. This implies
tm* =Uo +ep2 /2+rp(t 2c +tP2app )/2- t *(ac + /3cep )-tP *(ap + Ppep +ypea). (A7)
Substituting (A4), (A6) and (A7) into (A5) gives us
CE(Ya) = m[ap + /3(tc +t,/3p)+yp2 (m- t)] -(tc +t,) 2 /2 - (m- tp)2 2 /2
2ar t )2 P r
-(rp +ra)tc ra- /2-ra (m -t
.
o 2 / -r c2, /2-u o
(A8)
Solving the first order conditions of (A8), with respect to tc and tp, together give us
[fC2 +(ra +rp)aCC]rapp +p,2(ra +rp)acc
t ** = m
tc **=m [2
(A9)
+(ra + rp)ac][(ra + rp)p, +r2] + pp 2(ra +rp)ac
(rp. pp + p )l Pflc (A10)
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+ (ra + rp)'][(ra + r )app +y ,]+p 2 (r + r )a
- .
Notice that when yp =0, tp ** and t ** are exactly tp * and t * in Proposition 1.
Differentiating t * * and tc ** with respect to rp gives us
dt ** -2rp{[1 fc 2 +(ro +rp)occ]raapp +fp 2(ro +rp)cC}[,C 2 +(ro +rp)acc] <
dyp {[1c +(ra + rp)acc][(ra + r)Opp + p 2 ]+ (ra + rp)oCrCC}2
dtc ** 2yr/3/3cf{[C32 +(ra +rp)c)acc]raopp + p2 (ra +rp)acc} 
=m > 0.dyp {[c2 +(ra +r)oc][(r +rp)crpp + ]+/p (ra +r)acc}
Therefore, we have proved that tp * < tp * and tc * * > tc *.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8. The advertiser's payoff is
Ya = m(l-A)Op + (m-tp)/~p -t m -tcO c = (m- tp)Op -t m -tcO c .
2
The publisher's payoff is yp =tm + tc0 + t p - ep /2.
The new optimization problem is exactly the optimization problem in Proposition 1 with tp
replaced by Atp Thus, if we call the solutions of the new optimization problem tp * * * and
tc * ***, in order to distinguish them from the optimal solutions tp * and tc * in Proposition 1,
we have tp *** = tp * and tc *** = tc *. Because 0 < A < , we have t *** = t * > t *
and tc **=t c *.
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Renting versus Selling Durable Information Goods
ABSTRACT
A monopoly producer of a durable information good can either sell or rent its good to
consumers. We study whether the producer obtains a higher profit under a selling strategy or a
renting strategy. Our analysis shows that the conventional wisdom that a durable good
monopolist would always prefer renting to selling is no longer valid in the context of durable
information goods, because of the existence of "individual depreciation". We find that a renting
strategy leads to a higher producer surplus than a selling strategy does, when this individual
depreciation parameter is high, i.e., the utility a durable information good provides to consumers
decreases relatively slowly from the first consumption to the second consumption and so on. But
when the individual depreciation parameter is low, a renting strategy may lead to a lower
producer surplus than a selling strategy does. Whether a monopoly producer of a durable
information good should adopt a renting strategy depends on the individual depreciation
parameter of the good.
(Renting; Selling; Durable good; Information good)
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1. Introduction
Today the renting channel is an important channel for firms to distribute their information goods
to consumers. A significant proportion of the movie industry's revenue comes from movies
rentals. Software vendors have increasingly moved toward an Application Service Provider
(ASP) revenue model. In this revenue model, users, instead of taking the ownership of software,
rent software from vendors and pay monthly fees for their usage of software. However, research
that studies the distribution of information goods through the renting channel is scarce.' Almost
all the prior research on the pricing of information goods has focused on the distribution of
information goods through the retailing channel. For example, Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999)
have studied the pricing of bundled information goods and the implication of bundling on firm
profit and social welfare; Varian (1997) has developed a model for the sharing of information
goods among individual consumers; Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1997) have provided a framework
for the aggregation and disaggregation of information goods across products, time, and
individuals; and similar ideas have been explored in Chuang and Sirbu (1997). This paper aims
to study the strategy of a producer that rents its information good to consumers.
There is an extensive literature on the selling and renting strategies of durable goods. Recent
examples include Desai and Purohit (1998) and Huang et. al. (2001). The literature can be traced
back to the conjecture made by Coase (1972) and formalized by other researchers such as Bulow
(1982) and Stokey (1981). Coase conjectures that a firm that sells a durable good will lose its
monopoly power and be forced to lower its price from the beginning, if buyers of its good have
rational expectations and realize that the firm has an incentive to lower its price over time. It is
l An exception is Choudhary et. al. (1998) that studies the benefit of renting software due to software's network
externality.
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very difficult for the firm to make a credible commitment that it will not sell the good at a lower
price later on, unless it destroys its manufacturing capability. However, this problem does not
exist if the firm rents the good to consumers. The conventional wisdom is that a monopolist
producer would achieve a higher profit through renting its durable good than selling it durable
good. We extend this literature by examining whether the unique properties of information goods
could lead to a different conclusion.
We focus on information goods that are durable and can provide utilities to consumers over
multiple time periods. Normal durable goods such as automobiles, apartments, and refrigerators
provide reduced utilities to consumers over time. The reduction in utilities happens mainly
because of quality degradation, and it applies to all consumers. For example, a car provides a
lower utility in the second year than in the first year, and this reduction in utility applies to all
consumers. Durable information goods also provide reduced utilities to consumers over time.
However, the reduction in utilities happens depending on whether a consumer has consumed the
good before or not. A movie DVD provides a lower utility when it is consumed for the second
time than when it is consumed for the first time. But this lower utility only applies to consumers
who have consumed it before. To consumers who have not consumed it before, this movie DVD
would provide the same utility as a new movie DVD would, if it is not damaged and still
contains all the original information. We focus on this unique property of"individual
depreciation" possessed by durable information goods.
Our analysis shows that the conventional wisdom that a durable good monopolist would always
prefer renting to selling is no longer valid in the context of durable information goods, because
of the existence of "individual depreciation". We find that a renting strategy leads to a higher
producer's profit than a selling strategy does, when this individual depreciation parameter is
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high, i.e., the utility a durable information good provides to consumers decreases relatively
slowly from the first consumption to the second consumption and so on. But when the individual
depreciation parameter is low, a renting strategy may lead to a lower producer surplus than a
selling strategy does. Whether a monopoly producer of a durable information good should adopt
a renting strategy depends on the individual depreciation parameter of the good.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we develop a two-period model in
which a monopoly producer distributes a durable information good to consumers who have
heterogeneous valuations for the good. We solves for the optimal prices under a selling strategy,
with and without the possibility of making a credible commitment of not selling the good at a
lower price in Period 2, as well as the optimal rental fees under a renting strategy. Section 3
compares the results under various strategies and gives explanations for why one strategy may
dominate another. Section 4 concludes with some broader implications.
2. Model
In this section, we lay out basic assumptions of the model. We use a two-period model in which
a monopoly producer distributes a durable good to consumers who have heterogeneous
valuations for the good. As in most literature that study durable goods, we assume that the
producer has a zero marginal cost of production. The durable good can provide utilities to
consumers in both periods. We assume that consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their
valuations for the good. Their valuations for the good, denoted by v, are distributed uniformly
between zero and one.
We assume that the durable good may have individual depreciation, and we assume away the
quality degradation from Period 1 to Period 2. Take the consumer who has a valuation v for the
good for example. The good can provide a utility of v to this consumer in Period 1. If the
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consumer has consumed the good in Period 1, the good can provide a utility of 9v to this
consumer in Period 2. represents the good's individual depreciation and it is bounded between
zero and one ( < < 1). Notice that if 0 equals one, the good is just a normal durable good. If
0 is positive but less than one, the good is a durable information good. If 0 is zero, the good is a
non-durable good. If this consumer has not consumed the good in Period 1, the good can still
provide a utility of v to this consumer in Period 2.
Baseline Case: Selling with Commitment
We first consider a baseline case in which the monopoly producer sells the durable good to
consumers and the producer is assumed to be able to make a credible commitment of not selling
the good at a lower price in Period 2. Researchers have argued that this kind of commitment is
not time consistent-i.e., ex post, the producer would like to sell the good at a lower price. That
is, the commitment is not credible, unless the producer destroys its manufacturing capacity. We
only use this case as a baseline case, so that we compare the results in this case to the results in
other more realistic cases.
Consumers have two choices: either buy the good in Period 1 at price p and consume it in both
Period 1 and Period 2, or not buy the good at all. Suppose that a consumer with a valuation for
the good that is equal to v1 is indifferent between buying the good in Period 1 and not buying the
good at all. Such a consumer will obtain a utility of v1 in Period 1 and a utility of Ov, in Period 2
if she buys the good in Period 1. Thus we have the following equation: v1(1 + 0) - p = 0. All
consumers who have valuations that are greater than v will prefer to buy the good in Period 1.
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We can derive the demand for the good which is D(p) = 1- P . Therefore, the producer's1+0
profit is r(p) = D(p)p = (1- p )p
1+9
Solving the producer's profit maximization problem gives us the optimal price which is
P* = ( 20) along with the producer's maximum profit which is Tr* = (1 + 0)
2 4
Selling without Commitment
A more realistic case is that the monopoly producer cannot make a credible commitment of not
selling the good at a lower price in Period 2. In this case, consumers have three choices: either
buy the good in Period 1 at price p and consume it in both Period 1 and Period 2, or buy the
good in Period 2 at price P 2 and consume it in Period 2, or not buy the good at all. Suppose that
a consumer with valuation for the good that is equal to v is indifferent between buying the good
in Period 1 and buying the good in Period 2, and that a consumer with valuation for the good that
is equal to v2(v 2 < v1 ) is indifferent between buying the good in Period 2 and not buying the
good at all. It is straightforward to show that all consumers who have valuations that are greater
than vI will buy the good in Period 1, consumers who have valuations that are between v2 and
v1 will buy the good in Period 2, and consumers who have valuations that are lower than v2 will
not buy the good at all. We have the following two equations: v (1 + ) - Pl = v - P2, and
v2 -P 2 =0.
We solve the producer's optimization problem by backward induction. First, we solve the
producer's optimization problem in Period 2, given that consumers who have valuations that are
greater than vI have bought the good in Period 1. We will get the optimal price in Period 2 for
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each possible value of v1, that is, r2 *(v1). Given this optimal selling strategy in Period 2, we
then solve for the optimal price in Period 1. We have the following proposition that characterizes
the optimal strategy for renting the information good.
PROPOSITION 1. The optimal selling strategy for a monopoly producer of information goods is the
(0 + 1/ 2)2 h pia etlfei eid2ifollowing.: the optimal price in Period 1 is pi * 0 )2, the optimal rentalfee in Period 2 is
0 +1/2 )~~~~~2 +1 2
also P2* = +/,and the producer's profit is ur* = (0 + 1/2)2 under this optimal strategy.
40+1 4(0+1/4)
Proofs of the proposition and other propositions can be found in the Appendix.
Renting
We now consider the case in which the monopoly producer distributes the durable good to
consumers by renting it. Consumers do not take the ownership of the good, but they can use the
good for one period by paying a rental fee in each period. We let the rental fee in Period 1 be rl
and the rental fee in Period 2 be r2 . Consumers have four choices: either rent the good in both
Period 1 and Period 2, or rent the good in Period 1 only, or rent the good in Period 2 only, or not
rent the good at all.
We solve this case through backward induction. Suppose that consumers with valuation that are
greater than v, have rented the good in Period 1 and consumers with valuations that are less than
vI have not rented the good in Period 1. In Period 2, we will have two different groups of
consumers: consumers who have rented the good in Period 1 and consumers who have not rented
the good in Period 1. Consumers who have rented the good in Period 1 have valuations that are
distributed between 0v, and 0, while consumers who have not rented the good in Period 1 have
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valuations that are distributed between 0 and v. The total demand for the good in Period 2 is
the sum of the demands from these two different groups of consumers. The demand in Period 2
has different forms, depending on whether vI is greater than 0. Figure 1 shows these two
different cases.
When v < 0, the demand in Period 2 is
1-r 2 /
D2(r2,v1l) = -r2 / + v1 -r 2
1 - r 2
if v1 <r2 < 
if Ovl < r2 < V
if O<r2 <Ov1
When v 2 , the demand in Period 2 is
Vl-r2
D2 (r2 ,vl) = l-r 2 /0+ v-r 2
[1 -r2
if <r2 <V1
/f 9v1 <r 2 < 0 .
f 0 < r2 < v1
Case 1:
Vl<O ~ l l
-IOVI IR
1 0 V
Case 2: l I
v 1 0
VC 2 Ov 0
0 l
0 VI
consumers who have
rented in Period 1
consumers who have
not rented in Period 1
consumers who have
rented in Period 1
consumers who have
not rented in Period 1
Period 2
Figure 1: Consumers' Valuations for the Good in Period 1 and Period 2 in Two Cases
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We first solve for the optimal rental fee in Period 2 for each possible value of v1, that is,
r2 * (vI). Given this optimal renting strategy in Period 2, we then solve for the optimal rental fee
in Period 1, that is, r *. We have the following proposition that characterizes the optimal
strategy for renting the information good.
PROPOSITION 2. The optimal renting strategy for a monopoly producer of information goods is
the following: 1) when 0 1 / 3, the optimal rental fee in Period 1 is r * = , the optimal
1+ 0
0 0
rentalfee in Period 2 is also r2* = I, and the producer's profit is ir* = under this1+ 0 1+0
optimal strategy; 2) when 0 < 1/ 3, the optimal rental fee in Period 1 is rl * = 1, the optimal
1 1
rental fee in Period 2 is r2 * = -, and the producer's profit is r* = - under this optimal
2 4
strategy.
3. Comparing the Optimal Renting and Selling Strategies
In this section, we compare the results under a renting strategy with the results under a selling
strategy for. We show that a renting strategy leads to a higher producer surplus than a selling
strategy does, when individual depreciation parameter is high, that is, the utility a durable
information good provides to consumers decreases relatively slowly from the first consumption
to the second consumption and so on. But when individual depreciation parameter is low, a
renting strategy may lead to a lower producer surplus than a selling strategy does. We provide
explanations for why this happens. We also compare the results in these two cases with the
results in the baseline case, in which the monopoly producer sells the durable good to consumers,
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and the producer is assumed to be able to make a credible commitment of not selling the good at
a lower price in Period 2.
r\ U.O
0.5
0.4
2 0.3
0.2
0.1
0
selling with
commitment
....... selling
--renting
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Individual depreciation parameter 0
Figure 1: A Monopoly Producer's Profit in Three Cases
Figure 1 shows the maximum profit a monopoly producer can obtain under different individual
depreciation parameter 0. The solid line is the maximum profit when the producer sells the
durable good to consumers and the producer is assumed to be able to make a credible
commitment of not selling the good at a lower price in Period 2. The dotted line is the maximum
profit when the producer sells the durable good to consumers and the producer cannot make a
credible commitment of not selling the good at a lower price in Period 2. The dashed line is the
maximum profit when the producer rents the durable good to consumers.
When the Good is Normal Durable Good (0 = 1)
When 0 equals one, the good is just a normal durable good. In this case, the maximum profit
under a selling strategy is lower than the maximum profit under a renting strategy. A monopoly
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producer would prefer renting to selling. This result has been obtained by existing literature on
durable goods, e.g., Bulow (1982).
The intuition is the following. First, if the monopoly producer sells the good to consumers and
cannot make a credible commitment of not selling the good at a lower price in Period 2, then the
producer has an incentive to sell the good at a lower price in Period 2. The good sold in Period 2
is a substitute for the good sold in Period 1, because the good sold in Period 2 can provide utility
to consumers just like the good sold in Period 1 can, although the former only provides utility in
Period 2 while the latter provides utility in both periods. Knowing that the producer would like to
lower its price once Period 1 has passed, consumers have an option to wait until the price drops
in Period 2. Thus the producer loses some of its monopoly power and has to lower its price in
Period 1. The producer makes additional profit from sales in Period 2, but the additional profit in
Period 2 is not enough to offset the profit decrease in Period 1. Overall, the producer achieves a
lower profit if it cannot make a credible commitment of not selling the good at a lower price in
Period 2 than if it can make such a credible commitment.
However, a renting strategy would remove this inefficiency. The good rented in Period 2 is not a
substitute for the good rented in Period 1 at all. This is because a consumer who has valuation v
for the good in Period 1 still has the same valuation for the good in Period 2, no matter whether
the consumer has rented the good in Period 1 or not. A renting strategy would allow the producer
to achieve the profit that could have been achieved had the producer been able to make a credible
commitment of not selling the good at a lower price in Period 2 in the case of selling.
Figure 1 confirms what we have just discussed as it shows that the solid line (selling with
commitment) intersects the dotted line (renting) at 0 = 1 and both are higher than the dashed line
(selling) at 0 = 1.
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When the Good is Durable Information Good (0 < 0 < 1)
When 0 is less than one, the good is no longer a normal durable good. Instead, it is a durable
information good. In this case, the maximum profit under a selling strategy is not always lower
than the maximum profit under a renting strategy. When individual depreciation parameter is
high, a monopoly producer would prefer renting to selling. But when individual depreciation
parameter 0 is low, a monopoly producer would prefer selling to renting. Figure 1 shows that
the dotted line (renting) is higher than the dashed line (selling) when 0 is high, and that the
dotted line (renting) is lower than the dashed line (selling) when 0 is low. Both lines are lower
than the solid line (selling with commitment).
The intuition is the following. When 0 is less than one, the good rented in Period 2 becomes a
substitute for the good rented in Period 1. This is because consumption of the good in Period 1
lowers the valuation of the good in Period 2. Take the consumer who has valuation v for the
good in Period 1 for example. This consumer will have valuation v for the good in Period 2 if
the consumer has not rented the good in Period 1, and valuation v for the good in Period 2 if
the consumer has not rented the good in Period 1. When 0 is high, this substitution effect is
small. Thus, a renting strategy would allow the producer to achieve a profit level that is close to
what could have been achieved had the producer been able to make a credible commitment of
not selling the good at a lower price in Period 2 in the case of selling. But when 0 is low, this
substitution effect becomes significant, and renders a renting strategy very inefficient. A renting
strategy would lead to a profit level that is much lower than what could have been achieved had
the producer been able to make a credible commitment of not selling the good at a lower price in
Period 2 in the case of selling. In fact, the producer's profit under a renting strategy is even lower
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than the producer's profit under a selling strategy that does not allow the producer to make a
credible commitment of not selling the good at a lower price in Period 2.
When the Good is Non-durable Good ( = O)
When 0 is zero, the good is a non-durable good. All three strategies are equivalent in this case.
The producer would achieve the same profit no matter what strategy is adopted. This is reflected
in Figure 1 as all three lines intersect at 0 = 0.
4. Discussions
In this section we discuss the implications of the results derived in Section 3 and how our results
can be extended by future research.
Disney's Selling Strategy
Walt Disney Co. has long used a strategy of releasing its classic animated films and then making
them unavailable for up to ten years, in hopes to build consumers' demand for the films' future
re-releases. (Orwall 1999) In order to publicize this policy, Disney commercials frequently
deliver lines such as "This is your last chance to own this enchanting DVD, then it goes into the
vault for ten years!" Why does Disney have this policy? Does this policy cause Disney to lose
revenue or gain revenue? The framework developed in this model will help answer these
questions.
We argue that Disney's classic animated films are durable information goods that have a high
individual depreciation parameter (O is high). This is because the utilities these films can
provide to consumers decrease very slowly over time, as they are played again and again by their
consumers that are mainly children. For this type of goods, the monopoly producer obtains a
much higher profit if the producer can make a credible commitment of not selling the good at a
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lower price later on than if the producer cannot make such a commitment. Researchers have
argued that this kind of commitment is not credible, because they are time-inconsistent. But if
Disney can leverage its reputation and its long-standing policy of retiring films for up to ten
years to make this commitment credible to consumers, Disney will certainly obtain a higher
profit than it can otherwise.
What Products Should Be Sold and What Products Should Be Rented?
The decision of whether a durable good should be sold or rented has traditionally been made by
the good's producer based on its evaluation of the good's cost of production, cost of delivery,
and cost transaction in the retailing channel and in the renting channel. Information technology
has greatly reduced these costs, and in turn their effect on the producer's profit. This paper
suggests that in such a new environment, firms that produce durable goods, especially durable
information goods, should pay attention to their goods' individual depreciation parameter, when
they make a decision of whether to sell or rent their goods to consumers. For goods that can
consistently provide utilities to an individual consumer, such as classic movies, music, and
software that has a long life span, a renting strategy can lead to a higher profit to the producer
than a selling strategy does. But for goods that provide greatly reduced utilities to an individual
consumer after the first consumption, such as non-classic movies, fiction books, and software
that has a short life span, a renting strategy can lead the producer to a lower profit to the producer
than a selling strategy does.
There are a variety of ways our results can be extended by future research. First, we only focus
on how the individual depreciation parameter of durable goods affects a producer's strategy in
our analysis. Researchers may explore cases in which other properties of durable goods, such as
quality degradation and the experience good property, interact with individual depreciation. In
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addition, it may be interesting to study how the existence of secondary market may change some
of the current results.
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Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. We solve the producer's optimization problem by backward induction.
First, we solve the producer's optimization problem in Period 2, given that consumers who have
valuations that are greater than v have bought the good in Period 1. The producer's profit
function in Period 2 is if2 (vI, P2) = (vl - P2 )P2. Solving the producer's optimization problem in
Period 2 gives us the optimal price in Period 2, given that consumers who have valuations that
are greater than vI have bought the good in Period 1, which is P2 * (vl) = 2 . It also gives us the2
producer's maximum profit in Period 2, given that consumers who have valuations that are
2
greater than v1 have bought the good in Period 1, which is ;r2 * (vI) = V . Substituting the4
producer's optimal price in Period 2 into the equation that defines the consumer who has an
evaluation that is equal to v1 gives us pi = ( + 1/2)v .
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Now we solve the producer's optimization problem in Period 1. The producer's total profit in
both periods is (V ) = 7l (v ) + 2 * (v ) = (1 - v )p l + V= (1 - v )(0 + 1/ 2)v1 + I I . Solving4 22
the producer's optimization problem in Period 1 gives us that the optimal strategy is to set
vl* = 0 2 1/2 which is also equivalent to setting Pl* = (+ 2)2 . The producer's maximum20+1/2 ' 20+1/2
profit in this case is *
(0 +1/2)2
4(0+1/4) . We can also calculate the producer's optimal price in
Period 2, which is 0+1/240+1
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2.
Case 1: when v1 < , the demand in Period 2 is
1-r2 /0
1-r2 /0+vI -r2
1-r 2
if v1 < r2 0
if 0v, < r2 < v1 .
if O<r2 < Ov
We solve for the optimal rental fee in Period 2 for each possible value of v1, that is, r2 * (v 1).
Case 1.1 when 0 > 3/2
if vl (1- 1-0) /(20)
if (1- f - 0)/(20) < 1 1/ (20)
if 1/(20) < V < 0
Case 1.2 when x/2 < 0 < 1/2
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D2 (r2 V ) =
_
0/2
r2 *(VI) = Ov,
1/2
0/2
+vI)/(2+2/0)
O1/2v1/2
ifv1 < +O --1
if l+0-1 < <1/(20+1)
if l/(20 + 1) < v < 1/(20)
if 1/(20) < 1 < 0
Case 1.3 when 1/2 < 0 < /2
0/2
+ v) /(2 + 2/0)
OV1
if < /1+ -1
if +0-1<v1 <1/(20+1)
if 1/(20 + 1) < < 0
Case 1.4 when 0 < 1/2
ifv 1-f1+O-1
r2 *(v) (1 + v )/(2 + 2/0)
Case 2: when v1 8> 0, the demand in Period 2 is
D2 (r2 ,V ) =
if 0 <r2 < vI
V -r2 if OVI <r2 <0-
if 0 < r2 <0VI
We solve for the optimal rental fee in Period 2 for each possible value of v1, that is, r2 * (v1).
Case 2.1 when 0 > / 2
r2 *(V) 1/2 if O<v, <1
Case 2.2 when 1/,2 < 0 < x/2
Ov l
r2 * (Vl) =
11/2
if 0 < v, < 1/(20)
if 1/(20) < < 1
Case 2.3 when ( - 1)/2 < 0 < 1/2
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r2 *(V) = (1
r 2 *(Vl) = (1
(+ v1 )/(2+2/0)
r2 * ( l ) = 9 VI
V1 /2
if < v < 1/(20 + 1)
if 1/(20 + 1) < v1 < 0/(02 +1/4)
if 0/(02 + 1/4) < < 
Case 2.4 when 0 < ( - 1) / 2r2 * () (1 +v1)(2 + /0)
' V /2
if 0 < V1 1/( 1+1/ -1)
if /(j/1+ 1/0-l)<V <1
We can now combine these eight cases to five cases: 0 > i / 2, 1/2 < < / 2,
1/4 < < 1/ 2, (/ -1) / 2 < 0 < 1/4, 0 < (f2 -1) / 2. In each case, we can solve forthe optimal
rental fee in Period 1 r *, given the optimal renting strategy in Period 2.
CaseAl 0>3/2
1) if < (1- 1 0)/(2 0), we have
r * = (1 - -O) /(20), r2* = 0/2, r* = (1 - - ) /(20) * [1 - (1 - /-) /(20)] + 0 / 4
2) if (1 - -) /(20) < < 1/(20), we have r * = 0 /( + ),r2* = 0/( + 0), r*
3) if 1/(20) <v1 < 1, we have r* = 1/2,r 2* = 1/2, zr* = (30-1)/(40)
The maximum profit is achieved in 2).
CaseA2 1/2 < 0 < /2
1) if v < + 0-1, wehave
rl * = +-1, r2* = /2,r* = ( + -1) * (2 - 1+)+ /4
= 0/(1+0)
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2) if +9 -1 < v < 1/(28 + 1), we have
rl* = 9/(1 + 20),r 2* = 8/(1 + 29), r* = 9(30 + 1)/(1 + 20)2
3) if 1/(20 + 1) < vI < 1/(20), we have r * = /(1 + ),r2* = /(1 + ), * = 0 /(1 + )
4) if 1/(20) < v < 1, we have rl* = l/2,r2* = 1/2, * = (3 - 1)/(40)
The maximum profit is achieved in 3).
Case A3 1/4 < 0 < 1/2
1)if v < /+-1,wehave r*=x/+-1,r2*=0/2,z*=(+-1)*(2-.1+)+o/4
2) if V / i - 1 < < 1/(20 + 1), we have
r * = 0 /(1 + 20), r2* = /(1 + 20), at* = 0(30 + 1)/(1 + 20)2
3) if 1/(20 + 1) < vI < 9/(02 + 1/4), we have r,*= /(1 + ),r2 * = 9/(1+ ),;r* = 9/(1 + )
4) if /(02 +1/4) <vl < 1,wehave rl* = /2,r2* = 1/2,r* = 1/4
The maximum profit is achieved in 3) if 1/3 < < 1/2 and in 4) if 1/4 < < 1/3.
CaseA4 (2-1)/2 <<1/4
1) if v <1i+-1,wehave r*= +-1 , r2*=8/2,zr*=( +0-1)*(2- +8)+0/4
2) if + - < < 1/(20 + 1), we have
rl* = /(1 + 20), r2 * = /(1 + 20),r* = 9(30 + 1) /(1 + 20)2
3) if 1/(20 + 1) < v < /(02 + 1/4), we have
rl =8 2/(02 +1/4),r2* = 02 /(02 +1/4) r* = 02(2 -0 +1/2) (02 +1/4)2
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4) if /(02 +1/4) < v < 1, we have r* =l/2, r2* = 1/2,fr* = 1/4
The maximum profit is achieved in 4).
Case A5 0 < (/i -1) / 2
1)if v <1/+0-1,wehave r*=/1+0-l,r 2*=0/2,fr*=( l+0-1)*(2-/l+O)+0/4
2)if /l+0-1<v < 1/( 1 1/0-1),wehave
r,*= [1 + 1/(X/1 + 1/ -1)]/(2 + 2/0),r2* = [1 +1/(4/1 + 1/ -1)]1(2 + 210),
r* = [1+1/(1+1/0-1)][3 -1/(x/1+1/0 -1)]/(4+4/0)
3) if 0/(02 + 1/4)<v1 < 1, we have rl* = /2,r 2* = 1/2,* = 1/4
The maximum profit is achieved in 3).
Summarizing the optimal solution in Case A1 through A5, we have: 1) when 0 > 1 / 3, the
otm0 0
optimal rental fee in Perod is r*= 1 ~,theoptimalrental feeinPerod 2 is also r2 = --~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1 + 0 I' 
and the producer's profit is 0Jr* = - under this optimal strategy; 2) when 0 < 1/3, the optimal1+0
1
rental fee in Period 1 is rl * = 1, the optimal rental fee in Period 2 is r2 * the producer's
2
profit is Tr*
1
=- under this optimal strategy.
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